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xyz MCP by CyberXYZ

package_info

Read-only

CyberXYZ's public report for a package: every published advisory (CVE/GHSA ids, severity, CVSS, EPSS, KEV, affected ranges, fixed version), malicious-package records in full, how many packages depend on it, what it pulls in (counts and worst severity) and AI-model usage. Package-level; for a verdict on a specific version call check_package.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "ecosystem": "<ecosystem>",
      "name": "<name>"
    },
    "name": "package_info"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesPackage name as published (npm scopes like @org/pkg; Go module path; NuGet id)
ecosystemYesPackage ecosystem

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, openWorld, and non-destructive, so the description doesn't need to prove safety. It adds value by disclosing the breadth of the payload (full malicious-package records, aggregate dependent/transitive counts with worst severity), which tells the agent to expect a large report. No mention of rate limits, pagination, or error behavior for unknown packages, which keeps it from a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core purpose, followed by the content list and then the sibling routing pointer in the right order. The long parenthetical enumeration is dense but every element describes a distinct section of the report, so it earns its space; it is a single sentence that is slightly difficult to scan.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the burden of explaining return content, and it does so thoroughly across advisories, malware, dependents, transitive risk, and model usage. An agent has enough to choose and call it; only edge-case behavior (unknown package, oversized reports) is left unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and both parameters are described there, including the scoped-name and module-path conventions, so the description adds no syntax detail. It implies package-level lookup semantics but nothing beyond what the schema already documents, making baseline 3 correct.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('CyberXYZ's public report for a package') and enumerates the exact contents returned: advisories with CVE/GHSA ids, severity, CVSS, EPSS, KEV, affected ranges, fixed version, malicious-package records, dependent counts, transitive counts, and AI-model usage. It also explicitly scopes to package level, which separates it cleanly from check_package.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly says 'Package-level; for a verdict on a specific version call check_package', giving a concrete alternative and the condition that selects it. No guidance on when to prefer get_vulnerability or model_risk, but the alternatives named are sufficient for the main decision.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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