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xyz MCP by CyberXYZ

model_risk

Read-only

CyberXYZ's public report on a Hugging Face model's install risk: risk level, XYZ score, the driving reason, the worst dependencies and recent risk events. verdict UNKNOWN (not watched, pending, gated) is not safe: ask the user. Signing in adds every reason, all flagged dependencies and per-file load safety.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "repo_id": "<repo_id>"
    },
    "name": "model_risk"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
repo_idYesHugging Face repo id, owner/name (e.g. meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare a safe read (readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false, openWorldHint=true), so the bar is lower. The description still adds real value: results are public but partial, authentication unlocks every reason and all flagged dependencies, and UNKNOWN verdicts are explicitly flagged as untrustworthy. That auth-tier and interpretation context is not in the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, each carrying distinct information: what is returned, how to treat UNKNOWN, and what authentication adds. The parenthetical '(not watched, pending, gated)' is dense but earns its place by defining the verdict states; nothing is padded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, and the description compensates by enumerating the report's main fields, the degraded-verdict case, and the auth-expanded variant. For a one-parameter read tool, that is close to complete; only the absence of explicit sibling routing keeps it from a 5.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With a single required parameter at 100% schema description coverage, the schema already defines repo_id format and an example. The description adds only that the id refers to a Hugging Face model, which is mild reinforcement rather than new meaning.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific resource and scope: a public risk report for a Hugging Face model, covering risk level, XYZ score, driving reason, worst dependencies, and recent events. It is clearly distinguishable from package-oriented siblings like check_package and package_info, though it does not name those siblings explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives actionable guidance on the UNKNOWN verdict case ('ask the user') and notes that signing in expands the report, which implies a usage condition. However, it never states when to prefer this over get_vulnerability or check_package, so the agent must infer the model-vs-package split from the resource name alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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