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xyz MCP by CyberXYZ

check_package

Read-only

Public safety verdict for ONE package (optionally one version) from CyberXYZ's global threat data: known-malicious releases (always shown in full), advisories, commit-level analysis and version anomalies. Call it BEFORE adding or installing an npm, PyPI, Go or NuGet dependency. decision: block or quarantine = do not install; alert = installable but flagged; allow = ok; unknown = no record, not vetted: ask the user; unverified = the check did not complete: retry, then ask the user. Signing in adds the full install-time verdict (see sign_in_adds).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "ecosystem": "<ecosystem>",
      "name": "<name>"
    },
    "name": "check_package"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesPackage name as published (npm scopes like @org/pkg; Go module path; NuGet id)
versionNoExact version, e.g. 1.2.3. Omit to check the latest known release.
ecosystemYesPackage ecosystem: npm, pypi, go or nuget

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the readOnly/openWorld/non-destructive annotations: it says known-malicious releases are always shown in full regardless of tier, that signing in unlocks the full install-time verdict, and that 'unverified' means the check did not complete and should be retried before asking the user. The decision-value mapping (block/quarantine/alert/allow/unknown/unverified) with explicit agent actions is exactly the behavioral guidance the annotations cannot supply.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the verdict scope, then the call timing, then the decision semantics, so the most actionable content appears early. The decision glossary is dense but each entry carries a distinct agent instruction; the heavy backtick notation and length keep it from being maximally clean.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description compensates by enumerating what the verdict contains and defining every decision value plus the required follow-up action. It also discloses the auth-dependent difference in results, so an agent knows what it will and won't get back.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so name, version and ecosystem are already documented with formats and an enum, making the baseline 3 appropriate. The description only echoes that a version is optional ('optionally one version'), adding no format or edge-case meaning beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: a 'public safety verdict for ONE package (optionally one version) from CyberXYZ's global threat data', and enumerates what the verdict covers (malicious releases, advisories, commit-level analysis, version anomalies). It doesn't explicitly name how it differs from siblings like package_info or get_vulnerability, so an agent must infer the boundary, but the scope is otherwise unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a concrete trigger: 'Call it BEFORE adding or installing an npm, PyPI, Go or NuGet dependency', which tells the agent exactly when in the workflow to invoke it. It does not name alternatives or state when not to use it (e.g., for an already-installed dependency or bulk checks), leaving that to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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