Remove a webhook. Takes the id and the signing secret from registration, only the holder of the secret can remove it
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | ||
| secret | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | No | ||
| error | No | ||
| removed | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / x-lexicon / bundleSha256Previous value: -"a1c2e10fd3177d6b4d59ca78693e8fb36880165cf0f735f680dd86a510411178"New value: +"e5b4290024a229f2bdf97f8fc6a0079c3fe13b77267f41fdcffeb8b26aa1c41e"Input schema / x-lexicon / bundleSha256Previous value: -"1eeb782ee15fe69fc80776948e0556fa6b795e210e6305935b2c97b73d955cda"New value: +"a1c2e10fd3177d6b4d59ca78693e8fb36880165cf0f735f680dd86a510411178"Input schema / x-lexicon / bundleSha256Previous value: -"c014292cad7497ce9fd68c33345ac32cb42b672c8e77d6c749c26e162cc207e4"New value: +"1eeb782ee15fe69fc80776948e0556fa6b795e210e6305935b2c97b73d955cda"Input schema / x-aliasesAdded value: +{
+ "id": [
+ "Id",
+ "ID",
+ "@id"
+ ],
+ "secret": [
+ "Secret",
+ "secrets"
+ ]
+}Input schema / x-lexiconAdded value: +{
+ "bundleSha256": "c014292cad7497ce9fd68c33345ac32cb42b672c8e77d6c749c26e162cc207e4",
+ "name": "ChainHelix Agentic Lexicon",
+ "resolve": "lexicon_resolve",
+ "spec": "lexicon_spec",
+ "version": "0.1.0"
+}Input schema / x-vocabAdded value: +{
+ "id": "data.id",
+ "secret": "common.secret"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It adds a meaningful constraint: only the holder of the signing secret can remove the webhook. However, it does not disclose whether removal is idempotent, what happens if the webhook does not exist, or whether deletion is irreversible. For a mutating tool, this leaves notable gaps.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence that front-loads the main action and then packs in the essential parameter and authorization details. There is no filler or repetition; every word earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a two-parameter mutation tool with an output schema, the description covers the action, both parameters' semantics, and the security constraint. It could additionally mention whether deletion is idempotent and point to webhook_register/status as related tools, but nothing essential to invoking the tool correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It explains that 'id' identifies the webhook and that 'secret' is the signing secret from registration, adding meaning beyond the raw schema types. It could be more explicit about where the id comes from, but mapping both parameters to their roles is valuable.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description begins with a specific verb and resource: 'Remove a webhook.' This clearly distinguishes the tool from its siblings (webhook_register, webhook_status), which perform creation and status checking respectively. There is no ambiguity about what action this tool performs.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description states that the id and signing secret must come from registration and that only the secret holder can remove the webhook. This gives clear preconditions and an authorization requirement. It does not explicitly name sibling alternatives or state when not to use it, but the context is sufficiently clear for a simple unregister operation.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.