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Request Audit Tool

request_audit

Ask this company for an audit of the user's website. First call with the user's details: you get a summary and a privacy notice to show them. Only after they confirm, call again with confirm_token to send it. Never send without explicit confirmation.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "request_audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameNoFull name of the user. Required.
emailNoEmail to reply to. Required.
phoneNoPhone number, with country code if possible.
companyNoThe user's company.
messageNoWhat the user wants, in their words.
websiteNoWebsite to audit (full URL). Required.
confirm_tokenNoOnly on the second call, after the user confirmed the summary.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations contain only a title, so the description must carry the behavioral load — and it does: it discloses that this is an outbound send, that the first call is non-destructive and returns a summary plus privacy notice to present to the user, and that the actual send is gated on a second confirmed call. It does not cover failure modes, rate limits, or what happens if the user never confirms, but the core side-effect profile is disclosed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action is front-loaded, and the two-phase flow follows in order with no filler. The final sentence restates the confirmation gate already implied by 'Only after they confirm', but the redundancy is defensible for a safety-critical send.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 7-parameter tool with no output schema and no meaningful annotations, the description covers the agent's key questions: what gets sent, what the first call returns (summary and privacy notice), and how the confirmation step works. Only the behaviour after a declined confirmation or a failed call is left unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and each field already documents itself, including confirm_token's second-call-only semantics, so the description adds little beyond sequencing context for the first-vs-second call split. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb ('Ask ... for an audit') and a specific resource ('the user's website'), so the agent knows exactly what the tool produces. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from near-neighbours like request_contact or book_meeting, leaving the agent to infer the boundary from the topic alone.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It spells out the two-call protocol: first call with user details, second call with confirm_token only after the user confirms. It also states an explicit prohibition ('Never send without explicit confirmation'), which is the strongest possible when-not guidance for a send action.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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