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Rotate a worker's webhook signing secret

rotate_webhook_secret
Destructive

Replace the HMAC signing secret for one of your workers without touching the webhook URL or event subscriptions. Use this when a secret has leaked or been lost. The new secret is returned exactly once — hand it to the process that runs the worker and do not repeat it in chat. The previous secret stops validating immediately, so deliveries signed with it will fail until the worker is updated.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
worker_idYes

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only convey readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=true. The description goes well beyond that: the new secret is returned exactly once, must not be repeated in chat, the previous secret stops validating immediately, and signed deliveries fail until the worker is updated. No contradiction with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four sentences, each earning its place: the operation with its scope, the trigger condition, the one-time-return handling with a security warning, and the immediate-invalidation consequence. Purpose is front-loaded and no sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter destructive tool with no output schema, the description is complete: it covers the operation, when to invoke it, what the return value is (secret returned exactly once), and the post-condition (old secret immediately invalid, deliveries fail). The destructiveHint annotation carries the safety signal, so nothing essential is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It adds the ownership constraint ('one of your workers'), clarifying that worker_id must reference the agent's own worker, but it does not explain failure behavior for unknown/invalid IDs or otherwise enrich the parameter beyond what the UUID pattern in the schema already provides. Partial compensation.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Replace') and resource ('HMAC signing secret for one of your workers'), and explicitly scopes what it does not affect (webhook URL, event subscriptions). This distinguishes it from the set_webhook/clear_webhook siblings and from rotate_worker_key without needing to open any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides an explicit trigger condition: 'Use this when a secret has leaked or been lost.' It implies exclusions by stating it does not touch the webhook URL or event subscriptions, but it never names alternative tools for those cases, leaving a small amount of routing to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Disambiguation3/5

Most tools target a distinct resource and action, but several adjacent pairs are easy to confuse: add_comment vs add_progress_note, call_executor vs call_integration, log_client_decision vs update_client_context vs memory_save, and list_context_sources vs list_integrations. The descriptions do disambiguate them, but the boundaries are subtle enough that misselection is likely with 81 tools.

Naming Consistency4/5

The overwhelming majority follow a clear verb_noun snake_case pattern (create_task, update_project, list_integrations, set_webhook), and get_/ list_/ create_/ update_ families are predictable. Minor deviations exist: memory_read/memory_save/memory_search invert to object_verb, and bare nouns like whoami, glossary, and security_posture break the pattern, but there is no chaotic casing or mixed conventions.

Tool Count2/5

At 81 tools, this is far above the weight that is comfortable for an agent's tool-selection surface, especially since many tools belong to families that could be consolidated (webhooks, worker keys, project logs, context/memory). Although the domain is broad, the count will overwhelm agents and increase misrouting.

Completeness4/5

The surface is unusually comprehensive: tasks, projects, workers, leases, artifacts, comments, handoffs, webhooks, keys, context, memory, integrations, and support all have create/read/update/delete or equivalent lifecycle coverage. The gaps are minor, such as remove_dependency without a visible add_dependency and no artifact/comment deletion, but agents can work around them.

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