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find_security

Security artifacts across the catalog. Authentication, domain security, VDP, trust center. Understanding plan. Filter by q / tags / providers; include=["content"] inlines bodies. Use find_artifacts for cross-type search.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
qNoFree text over name + description.
pageNo
sortNoOrder: name, or scheme_count (largest first).
tagsNoTag slugs.
limitNo
matchNoany
contextNoOptional: why you are asking. One sentence — the task you are trying to complete, or what you expect to get back. Never included in the answer and never used to rank; it is read only when a result turns out to be wrong, which is when knowing the intent is what makes the report actionable.
includeNo
providersNo

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description must carry the behavioral transparency burden. It discloses that include=["content"] inlines bodies and that filtering is by q/tags/providers. However, it does not explicitly state whether the operation is read-only, mention the context parameter's role, or describe any side effects. As a find command, read-only behavior is implied, but the description alone gives only partial transparency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is short and front-loads the core resource, but it contains two fragments ('Authentication, domain security, VDP, trust center.' and 'Understanding plan.'), one of which is unclear. The useful directives (filtering, include, alternative) are compact, but the ambiguous fragment wastes a sentence and reduces structural quality.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 9-parameter tool with no output schema, the description covers the essential search behavior (scope, filters, body inlining) and sibling routing. It does not describe default paging, sorting behavior, or what the response shape looks like, and the 'Understanding plan' fragment adds confusion. It is minimally viable but leaves several behavioral gaps.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is low (44%). The description adds meaning to the include parameter (inlining bodies) and identifies providers as a filter, but it does not explain pagination params (page, limit) or the match/context parameters beyond what the schema already provides. Some compensation occurs, but not enough for the coverage gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a clear resource and scope: 'Security artifacts across the catalog.' It enumerates relevant categories (Authentication, domain security, VDP, trust center) and distinguishes itself from find_artifacts by specifying that tool is for cross-type search. However, the fragment 'Understanding plan' is ambiguous and detracts slightly from an otherwise clear purpose.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly provides an alternative: 'Use find_artifacts for cross-type search.' This tells the agent that find_security is for security-artifact-only searches and find_artifacts is the broader option. It does not enumerate exclusions, but the key routing guidance is present.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Disambiguation3/5

Most tools are clearly separated by artifact type or resource (find_mcp vs find_openapi vs get_provider vs get_api), but the sheer volume creates some genuinely confusable clusters: apis_io_search vs find_apis vs find_artifacts, and insights_adoption vs insights_dimensions vs find_company_insights. Several readiness-related tools (what_can_i_fix, simulate_fixes, readiness_gates) also share a conceptual boundary, though their descriptions do help.

Naming Consistency3/5

The dominant patterns (find_*, get_*, cohort_*, compare_*) are consistent and predictable, but the set mixes in irregular names like apis_io_search, tag_group_tags, what_can_i_fix, whats_changed, and resolve. These deviations are readable but break the otherwise regular verb_noun convention.

Tool Count2/5

106 tools is far beyond the typical well-scoped server and will impose a heavy selection burden on agents. The server covers a genuinely broad domain (catalog search, ratings, cohorts, agent readiness, lists, exports, feedback), so the count is defensible in scope, but it is still too many to navigate efficiently.

Completeness5/5

The surface is remarkably complete: search and browse, single-entity detail, comparisons, cohort analytics, agent-readiness assessment, saved searches, list management, feedback/correction flows, and full dataset exports are all covered. There are no obvious dead ends, and even minor operations like re-running saved searches or simulating fixes are present.

Resources