Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already convey read-only, idempotent, and non-destructive behavior. The description adds meaningful beyond annotations: it clarifies the exact categories of boundaries returned and attaches a credential-safety guardrail that prevents misuse of an agent-facing security tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences carry the entire tool contract: the first defines scope and output topics, the second adds a critical safety restriction. There is no filler or repetition of the title or annotations.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a zero-parameter read-only tool with no output schema, the description is complete enough: it names the information domain, lists constituent boundary categories, and includes the only practical misuse warning. Nothing essential is missing for an agent to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has zero parameters, so the baseline is 4 and the description does not need to add parameter-level context. The no-parameter contract is fully represented by an empty schema with additionalProperties false.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Return') and a precise resource ('Aperture Wallet self-custody storage, network, recovery, access-control, responsible-disclosure, and agent-safety boundaries'), enumerating the topics it covers. This clearly distinguishes it from content-focused siblings like get_article, get_feature, and list_articles.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies when to use the tool: whenever Aperture security boundaries are needed, and it gives an explicit exclusion by warning never to request or process wallet credentials. It does not name alternative tools or contrast them, but no sibling appears to cover security boundaries.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.