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mcp-server

by io.alterlab
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Request Credential

alterlab_request_credential
Destructive

Request a login, one-time code seed or other credential for a task without ever seeing it. Returns an entry_url for the user to open and seal the value in their browser (the confirmation code is never returned to the agent; the user's own session needs none); the value never passes through chat or this tool. When status becomes provided, fill it with a fill_secret action carrying credential_request and field. reuse is once, task or standing; the domain must be within the task's allowed domains.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "task_id": "<task_id>",
      "domain": "<domain>",
      "fields": "<fields>"
    },
    "name": "alterlab_request_credential"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
reuseNoHow long the credential stays usable; default once
domainYesSite the credential is for, e.g. example.com
fieldsYesValues to request
reasonNoWhy it is needed, shown to the user
task_idYesTask that needs the credential
use_limitNoMaximum fills
expires_in_sNoLink lifetime in seconds; default 900
ask_each_timeNoRequire user confirmation per later task; default false
valid_for_daysNoStanding credential lifetime in days

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, and the description adds substantial context the annotations cannot: the value is sealed in the user's browser via an entry_url, is never returned to the agent or exposed in chat, and reuse is bounded. It does not explain what the destructive hint covers (whether the credential is consumed or revoked after use_limit), which is the main remaining gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The content is dense but poorly front-loaded: the core security model is buried in long, comma-spliced sentences and a parenthetical ('the confirmation code is never returned to the agent; the user's own session needs none') that is hard to parse. Nearly every clause carries information, but the structure obscures it.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 9-parameter mutation tool with a destructive hint and no output schema, the description covers the request-then-seal-then-fill lifecycle but omits return shape details beyond entry_url and status, and says nothing about expiry behaviour, revocation, or failure modes. Adequate, but not complete for the tool's complexity.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description still adds meaning by tying 'reuse' to a lifecycle and by imposing the allowed-domains constraint on 'domain', which the schema does not express. It does not clarify the interaction between use_limit, valid_for_days and expires_in_s.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening sentence states a specific verb and resource: 'Request a login, one-time code seed or other credential for a task.' It also captures the defining property (the agent never sees the value). It does not explicitly name a sibling it replaces, so it lands short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives useful follow-up guidance ('When status becomes provided, fill it with a fill_secret action') and a constraint ('the domain must be within the task's allowed domains'). However, it never states when to choose this tool over neighbours like alterlab_create_account or alterlab_hands_access, so the when-to-use decision is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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