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Aeroz

Bind a graded item

bind_graded_item

Bind an Aeroz chip to a graded collectible slab (PSA, CGC, SGC, BGS, TAG). The chip UID, grader, cert number, grade and card identity are signed together, so the chip vouches for exactly this label: a label moved to another holder, or a cert reprinted on a copy, shows as "binding broken" on a buyer's tap. For PSA, the cert is cross-checked against PSA's own record when PSA_API_TOKEN is configured; a disagreement flags the item. grader_check is match, mismatch, not_found, unavailable (nobody looked), or unverified_identity (the grade agrees but the grader's record does not confirm the card). A chip that has ever been bound to a graded item is refused (use a new chip), and so is a grader cert already bound to another chip — for a re-holdered slab, retire the old binding with record_provenance first. Returns the public verify URL to encode in the slab's QR. This does NOT grade the card and does not claim the card was unaltered before sealing — never present it as either.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
uidYesChip UID bonded to the slab (at most 64 characters, as verify_chip accepts).
yearNo
gradeYesAs printed: "10", "9.5", "8 OC", "Authentic", "Authentic Altered".
titleYese.g. "2003 Topps Chrome LeBron James #111"
graderYes
publicNoResolvable by a public tap (default true).
subjectNo
varietyNo
categoryNo
set_nameNo
sealed_atNo
sealed_byNo
card_numberNo
cert_numberYes
back_image_urlNo
front_image_urlNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations by disclosing the cryptographic signing model, the buyer-facing 'binding broken' failure mode, the grader_check value set and meanings, refusal conditions, and the returned verify URL. It also guards against misuse by stating what the tool does NOT do (it does not grade the card or attest pre-sealing condition).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then layered with the security rationale, refusal rules, and the explicit non-claims. Length is justified by the density of distinct, decision-relevant facts; no sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description correctly states the return value (public verify URL). For a 16-param mutation tool the core behavior is well covered, but the optional identity/metadata parameters remain unaddressed, leaving a modest gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only 25% of the 16 parameters are described in the schema, so the description does carry weight for the required fields (uid, grade format, cert, grader) and their signing semantics. However, the 11 optional identity fields (subject, variety, category, set_name, sealed_at, images, etc.) are neither documented in the schema nor explained here.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (bind) and resource (an Aeroz chip to a graded collectible slab, with named graders). It is clearly distinguishable from siblings like verify_chip, graded_item, and record_provenance.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly covers when the call is refused (chip already bound, cert already bound) and names the alternative path: retire the old binding with record_provenance first. It also states the precondition for PSA cross-checking (PSA_API_TOKEN configured).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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