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authorize_image_uploads

Prepares out-of-band uploads for image files, so their bytes never pass through this conversation. For each file returns file.uri (pass it as image to upload_entity_image) and upload (send the raw bytes as the body of an HTTPS PUT to upload.url before upload.expiresAt). Declare each file's exact byte size; its type must be image/png, image/jpeg, image/webp or image/gif, at most 20MB. An optional sha-256 digest is checked on upload. Requires the Editor role.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "campaignId": "<campaignId>",
      "files": "<files>"
    },
    "name": "authorize_image_uploads"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
filesYesThe files to upload, at most 50: [{"name": "Vorlag.jpg", "mimeType": "image/jpeg", "size": 248123, "digest": {"algorithm": "sha-256", "value": "<base64url, no padding>"}}]. digest is optional.
campaignIdYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With only openWorldHint=false and destructiveHint=false supplied, the description carries real weight: it discloses the out-of-band delivery model, the expiry deadline on the upload URL, optional sha-256 verification on upload, the Editor role requirement, and the type/size caps. Those are exactly the operational facts an agent needs before committing, and none are derivable from the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the purpose, then the return contract, then the constraints. Every clause adds an operational fact; nothing is restated from the schema or the title.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description must describe the return shape — and it does, naming `file.uri` and both `upload.url` and `upload.expiresAt`. Combined with the role and size constraints, an agent has everything needed to complete the exchange without a follow-up call.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Coverage is 50%, and the description compensates well for the `files` side: exact declared byte size, the four permitted mime types, the 20MB ceiling, and that the digest is optional and checked on upload. `campaignId` is never explained in the description, leaving the one gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource — 'prepares out-of-band uploads for image files' — plus the defining property that bytes never pass through the conversation. It also names the downstream sibling upload_entity_image, so an agent can distinguish this tool from the plain image-upload tool without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The two-step workflow is spelled out: call this, take `file.uri`, pass it as `image` to upload_entity_image, and PUT the bytes to `upload.url` before `upload.expiresAt`. Hard constraints (allowed mime types, 20MB, Editor role) are also stated. What's missing is an explicit exclusion — it never says a file cannot be passed inline to upload_entity_image — but the ordering is unambiguous.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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