Handsome Hosting

Reissue a certificate

tls_reissue

Destructive

Renew the certificate of one served name now (no money, runs on the call): only on a running server with no deploy in progress, at most once every 34 hours per name (the certificate issuer allows five a week, and a reissue deletes the old one first), never for a custom certificate the person uploaded. Refusals: not-served, custom, deploy-open, too-soon, reissue-failed.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "serviceId": "<serviceId>",
      "name": "<name>"
    },
    "name": "tls_reissue"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`name`	Yes	a name the service serves
`serviceId`	Yes	the id of a service on this account

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`ok`	Yes
`data`	No
`error`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedOct 26, 2026

changedInput schema / properties / name / description

Previous value: -"a name tls_status lists"New value: +"a name the service serves"

changedInput schema / properties / serviceId / description

Previous value: -"the service id from list_services"New value: +"the id of a service on this account"

First observedOct 23, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the destructiveHint=true annotation by explaining the cost model (no money), synchronous execution, the rate limit and its upstream rationale (issuer allows five a week), and that a reissue deletes the old certificate first. It also lists the refusal modes (not-served, custom, deploy-open, too-soon, reissue-failed), which is the kind of behavior an agent cannot infer from the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then the constraints in descending importance. Every clause carries real information (cost, timing, deletion, refusals), though the single dense sentence with stacked parentheticals is slightly harder to parse than it needs to be.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained here. With preconditions, rate limits, destructive behavior, and refusal codes all covered, an agent has everything required to decide and call correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both serviceId and name are already documented. The description reinforces that name must be a served name and that the service must be running, but adds no format or syntax detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: renew the certificate of one served name, performed immediately ('runs on the call'). This is clearly separable from the read-only sibling tls_status.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Enumerates the exact preconditions and exclusions: running server, no deploy in progress, at most once per 34 hours per name, and never for a custom uploaded certificate. An agent knows precisely when this call is legal and when it must not be used.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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