secureIT Sicherheits-Checks

Passwort-Leak-Check (nur SHA-1-Hash)

passwort_leak_check

Prüft, ob ein Passwort in bekannten Datenlecks vorkommt (Have I Been Pwned, k-Anonymität). Erwartet AUSSCHLIESSLICH den SHA-1-Hash des Passworts (40 Hex-Zeichen), nie das Passwort selbst. Bitten Sie Nutzer NICHT, Ihnen ein Passwort zu nennen — ein Passwort im Chatverlauf ist selbst schon ein Leck. Kann der Nutzer keinen Hash erzeugen, verweisen Sie auf die Webseite, die alles im Browser rechnet.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "sha1": "<sha1>"
    },
    "name": "passwort_leak_check"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`sha1`	Yes	SHA-1-Hash des Passworts, 40 Hex-Zeichen.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 13, 2026

TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses the privacy-preserving design (k-anonymity, hash-only input) and the security rationale for never handling plaintext. It stops short of describing the match/miss outcome or any rate limits, but the critical privacy behavior is well covered.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tightly-written sentences, front-loaded with the purpose and the hard input constraint, followed by behavioral guidance and a fallback. Every sentence earns its place with no redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter, no-annotation tool with no output schema, the description is complete on the input and safety dimensions. It could say a little more about what a positive vs. negative lookup returns, but nothing essential for invoking the tool correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the sole parameter already documents the SHA-1 hash and its 40-hex-character format. The description reiterates the constraint emphatically but adds no syntax or format detail beyond what the schema provides, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (prüft) and resource (Passwort in bekannten Datenlecks) and names the underlying mechanism (Have I Been Pwned, k-Anonymität). No sibling tool overlaps this security topic, so an agent can pick it unambiguously from dns_check, phishing_selbsttest, etc.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit operating instructions: use only the SHA-1 hash, never request the plaintext password, and a concrete fallback (refer the user to the browser-based website) when no hash can be produced. This is clear when-to-use and when-not-to-do guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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