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upload_hitl_keys

Destructive

Upload an encryption keypair for a HITL config. The server validates the RSA-4096 public key and computes the key ID. Note: the encrypted_private_key is already encrypted client-side with the user's password — the server never sees the password.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "hitl_id": "<hitl_id>",
      "public_key": "<public_key>",
      "encrypted_private_key": "<encrypted_private_key>",
      "kdf_salt": "<kdf_salt>"
    },
    "name": "upload_hitl_keys"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dek_ivNov2 envelope: the IV of that wrapping
dek_tagNov2 envelope: the GCM tag of that wrapping
hitl_idYesHITL config ID
kdf_saltYesBase64url-encoded PBKDF2 salt
public_keyYesPEM-encoded RSA-4096 SPKI public key
wrapped_dekNov2 envelope: the data key wrapped under the master key
backup_dek_ivNov2 envelope: the IV of the recovery wrapping
backup_dek_tagNov2 envelope: the GCM tag of the recovery wrapping
backup_wrapped_dekNov2 envelope: the data key wrapped under the recovery code
encrypted_private_keyYesJSON-serialized encrypted private key envelope (PBKDF2-SHA256+AES-256-GCM)

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
kidYesThe stored key's id
messageYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed7 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / backup_dek_iv
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "v2 envelope: the IV of the recovery wrapping",
+  "maxLength": 64,
+  "minLength": 1,
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / backup_dek_tag
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "v2 envelope: the GCM tag of the recovery wrapping",
+  "maxLength": 64,
+  "minLength": 1,
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / backup_wrapped_dek
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "v2 envelope: the data key wrapped under the recovery code",
+  "maxLength": 500,
+  "minLength": 1,
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / dek_iv
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "v2 envelope: the IV of that wrapping",
+  "maxLength": 64,
+  "minLength": 1,
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / dek_tag
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "v2 envelope: the GCM tag of that wrapping",
+  "maxLength": 64,
+  "minLength": 1,
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • addedInput schema / properties / wrapped_dek
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "v2 envelope: the data key wrapped under the master key",
+  "maxLength": 500,
+  "minLength": 1,
+  "type": "string"
+}
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": {},
+  "description": "The keypair stored",
+  "properties": {
+    "kid": {
+      "description": "The stored key's id",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "message": {
+      "type": "string"
+    }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "kid",
+    "message"
+  ],
+  "type": "object"
+}
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already mark this as a destructive write operation, and the description adds important context: Proof account authentication is required, the server validates the RSA-4096 public key, and the server never sees the user's password. It stops short of stating whether an upload overwrites existing keys or how that destruction manifests.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose is front-loaded, and the authentication note is clearly separated. Every sentence adds useful information about validation, encryption handling, or access requirements.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the rich schema, output schema, and annotations, the description covers the essential purpose, validation behavior, and authentication requirement. The main omission is the destructive consequence of uploading keys, such as whether existing key material is replaced.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all 10 parameters in detail. The description reinforces the meaning of public_key and encrypted_private_key but does not add guidance on the optional v2 envelope fields such as wrapped_dek, dek_iv, dek_tag, or the backup_* parameters.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: upload an encryption keypair for a HITL config. It also clarifies the server-side validation/ID behavior, making it clearly distinct from get_hitl_keys and delete_hitl_keys.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a clear authentication prerequisite and explicitly says start_login does not open this tool. However, it does not explain when to use this tool versus related siblings such as create_hitl, update_hitl, get_hitl_keys, or delete_hitl_keys.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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