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update_profile_proofs

Destructive

Update which verified assets (proofs) are displayed on a specific profile. Controls visibility, privacy masking, ordering, and labels.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "profile_id": "<profile_id>",
      "proofs": "<proofs>"
    },
    "name": "update_profile_proofs"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
proofsYesProofs to display on profile
profile_idYesProfile ID
proof_orderNoWho orders the shown proofs: `default` (domain, social, Telegram bot, email, phone, wallet, then display_order) or `owner` (display_order alone). Omitted, the profile keeps its current setting.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
proof_orderYesWho decided the order of a profile's proofs. `default`: domain, social account, Telegram bot, email, phone, wallet, then each proof's `display_order`. `owner`: the owner's `display_order` alone — send it when the owner reorders. The first shown proof that is not hidden leads the profile's preview card, share tags and badge. Omitted on an update, the profile keeps its current setting.
public_proofsYesThe shown proofs, in the order the public profile shows them

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / proof_order
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Who orders the shown proofs: `default` (domain, social, Telegram bot, email, phone, wallet, then display_order) or `owner` (display_order alone). Omitted, the profile keeps its current setting.",
      +  "enum": [
      +    "default",
      +    "owner"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": {},
      +  "description": "A sub-account's shown proofs after an update",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "proof_order": {
      +      "description": "Who decided the order of a profile's proofs. `default`: domain, social account, Telegram bot, email, phone, wallet, then each proof's `display_order`. `owner`: the owner's `display_order` alone — send it when the owner reorders. The first shown proof that is not hidden leads the profile's preview card, share tags and badge. Omitted on an update, the profile keeps its current setting.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "public_proofs": {
      +      "description": "The shown proofs, in the order the public profile shows them",
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": {},
      +        "properties": {
      +          "asset_id": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "channel": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "delegate_type": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "delegation_id": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "display_order": {
      +            "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +            "minimum": -9007199254740991,
      +            "type": "integer"
      +          },
      +          "display_value": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "is_revoked": {
      +            "type": "boolean"
      +          },
      +          "is_visible": {
      +            "type": "boolean"
      +          },
      +          "label": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "mask_level": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "type": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "verified_at": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "required": [
      +          "asset_id",
      +          "type",
      +          "display_value",
      +          "verified_at",
      +          "is_visible",
      +          "display_order",
      +          "mask_level"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "public_proofs",
      +    "proof_order"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
    • removedInput schema / properties / proofs / items / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
    • addedInput schema / properties / proofs / items / properties / display_order / maximum
      Added value: +9007199254740991
  3. First observed

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, and the description adds the authentication requirement and the tool's scope. The key missing fact is whether the `proofs` array replaces the full set (dropping proofs not listed) — critical for a destructive write, and left unstated.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences: the capability is front-loaded and the auth caveat follows. Every line carries information, though the auth note is somewhat procedural.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the auth prerequisite is covered. Still, for a destructive update that takes an array, the replace-vs-merge semantics and the distinction from update_public_proofs are absent, leaving an agent to guess at the highest-risk behavior.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the nested fields plus the proof_order enum are documented in the schema itself. The description's phrase 'visibility, privacy masking, ordering, and labels' only loosely maps to those fields and adds no syntax or precedence detail beyond it, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource (update which verified proofs are displayed on a profile) and enumerates the controllable facets (visibility, masking, ordering, labels). It does not distinguish itself from the very similar sibling update_public_proofs, which an agent would need to choose between.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit precondition for use ('needs a Proof account', authenticate this client) and usefully warns that start_login does not unlock this tool. However, it offers no guidance on when to pick this over update_public_proofs or update_profile, so the alternative-selection question is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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