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update_profile_proofs

Update which verified assets (proofs) are displayed on a specific profile. Controls visibility, privacy masking, ordering, and labels.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
proofsYesProofs to display on profile
profile_idYesProfile ID

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are present, so the description carries the full disclosure burden. It does disclose the operation's effect, the access requirement, and a start_login caveat. But it does not state whether the proofs array is a full replacement or a partial update, what happens to omitted proofs, what permissions beyond having an account are needed, or what response/error behavior to expect.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose is front-loaded in one clear sentence, followed by a compact control enumeration and a terse access note. Each sentence earns its place, and the structure is easy to scan, though the ACCESS block could be tightened slightly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a mutation tool with two parameters and complete schema coverage, the definition is mostly workable, and the authentication flow is a valuable addition. It is incomplete because it never clarifies replacement semantics, sibling differentiation, or expected return behavior, which matters given no output schema and no annotations.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description's mention of visibility, privacy masking, ordering, and labels maps conceptually to is_visible, mask_level, display_order, and label, which adds framing but no new technical detail beyond what the schema already documents.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Update') and resource ('verified assets/proofs displayed on a specific profile'), and enumerates the controlled aspects: visibility, privacy masking, ordering, and labels. It is clear on its own, but it does not explicitly differentiate itself from nearby siblings like update_public_proofs, update_profile, or update_my_profile, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives a concrete prerequisite (Proof account), an explicit authentication flow (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate, then call again), and a useful caveat that start_login does NOT open this tool. However, it does not explain when to prefer this tool over update_public_proofs or update_profile, so selection guidance among alternatives is incomplete.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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