Proof Holdings

rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret

Destructive

Replace a webhook endpoint's signing secret and return the new one — this and create_webhook_endpoint are the only times a secret is returned, so store it now. New deliveries are signed with the new secret; deliveries already queued keep the secret they were queued with.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`id`	Yes	Webhook endpoint ID

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	No	MongoDB ObjectId
`url`	No	HTTPS URL deliveries are POSTed to, at most 2000 characters. Private, loopback and link-local addresses are refused.
`scope`	No	`all` — every sub-account, present and future, plus account-level events. `selected` — only the sub-accounts in `profile_ids`; account-level events never reach it.
`events`	No
`legacy`	No	The endpoint converted from the account's single webhook URL — the one the deprecated `/me/settings` webhook block reads and writes.
`secret`	No	The signing secret — returned only in this response. Store it now.
`status`	No	A `disabled` endpoint receives nothing; its history and secret are kept.
`created_at`	No
`secret_set`	No	Whether the endpoint has a signing secret (always true).
`updated_at`	No
`description`	No
`profile_ids`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

AddedNov 2, 2026

TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructiveHint/readOnlyHint annotations, it discloses the non-obvious propagation semantics: new deliveries use the new secret while already-queued deliveries keep the old one, which matters for anyone verifying signatures. It also flags the one-time secret visibility and the auth flow required to invoke it.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core behavior and the secret-visibility warning are front-loaded in a single efficient sentence, followed by the propagation caveat. The ACCESS block is boilerplate-heavy but operationally necessary given the tool is gated.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Output schema exists so return values needn't be described, annotations cover the destructive profile, and the description covers the remaining gaps: secret-handling obligation, delivery-signature transition, and authentication requirements. Nothing needed to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With one parameter and 100% schema description coverage, the schema already documents 'id' including the 24-hex-char pattern. The description adds no format or sourcing hints for the ID, so this sits at the documented baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Replace a webhook endpoint's signing secret') and adds the crucial outcome ('return the new one'), which no sibling name conveys. It also names create_webhook_endpoint as the only other secret-returning path, orienting the agent within the webhook tool family.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a clear operative condition ('store it now' because this is one of only two times the secret is exposed) plus explicit access prerequisites and a note that start_login does NOT unlock this tool. It stops short of contrasting against the near-miss sibling rotate_callback_secret or update_webhook_endpoint.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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