Proof Holdings

revoke_delegation

Destructive

Revoke ONE delegation. The domain control proof and sibling delegations stay valid; the revocation is mirrored into the proof registry so the CRL, status list and public status lookup all see it. Idempotent: a repeat revoke answers success with the same body, both here and through revoke_proof with the ph_dlg_ handle — unlike a PROOF, where a repeat answers already_revoked. The result carries the DERIVED effective_status/is_valid beside the stored status.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "revoke_delegation"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`id`	Yes	Delegation ID (24-hex Mongo id or ph_dlg_<32 hex> handle)
`reason`	No	Reason for revocation

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	No	MongoDB ObjectId
`scope`	No	Deprecated. Delegation schema 2.0 carries no scope; this array stays for the SDKs released before it: the scope a delegation issued before schema 2.0 was stored with, otherwise empty. Removed in the next major version.
`status`	No	The owner's OWN record — whether they revoked this delegation themselves. Nothing else writes it: neither the control proof dying nor this delegation's own lifetime running out. Liveness is DERIVED and reported separately as `effective_status`. This stored field is also what `?status=` filters on
`delegate`	No	Typed delegate identifier
`is_valid`	No	True only when `effective_status` is `active`. It is a restatement of that field, not a second opinion: expiry is decided once, inside the derivation above
`issued_at`	No
`principal`	No	The proven domain that authorized the delegate — derived from the control proof, never client input
`created_at`	No
`expires_at`	No	Never later than the control proof's own expiry at issuance (effective expiry is min of the two)
`revoked_at`	No
`environment`	No
`control_proof`	No	The control proof handle this delegation points down to
`delegation_id`	No	Stable public handle (`ph_dlg_<32 hex>`) — also the token's `sub`, and accepted by the proof status endpoint
`revoked_reason`	No
`effective_status`	No	DERIVED liveness, computed at read time from BOTH clocks that govern a delegation: the control proof it stands on (cascade rule a — revoked, suspended or expired flows through) and its own `expires_at` (rule b — effective expiry is the earlier of the two). Either one running out reports `expired` here while the delegation's own `status` stays untouched. This is the field to render — `status` alone would show a live badge on a delegation every verifier already rejects

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedNov 5, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / scope / description

Added value: +"Deprecated. Delegation schema 2.0 carries no scope; this array stays for the SDKs released before it: the scope a delegation issued before schema 2.0 was stored with, otherwise empty. Removed in the next major version."

Changed1 schema field changedNov 2, 2026

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": {},
+  "properties": {
+    "control_proof": {
+      "description": "The control proof handle this delegation points down to"
+    },
+    "created_at": {},
+    "delegate": {
+      "description": "Typed delegate identifier"
+    },
+    "delegation_id": {
+      "description": "Stable public handle (`ph_dlg_<32 hex>`) — also the token's `sub`, and accepted by the proof status endpoint"
+    },
+    "effective_status": {
+      "description": "DERIVED liveness, computed at read time from BOTH clocks that govern a delegation: the control proof it stands on (cascade rule a — revoked, suspended or expired flows through) and its own `expires_at` (rule b — effective expiry is the earlier of the two). Either one running out reports `expired` here while the delegation's own `status` stays untouched. This is the field to render — `status` alone would show a live badge on a delegation every verifier already rejects"
+    },
+    "environment": {},
+    "expires_at": {
+      "description": "Never later than the control proof's own expiry at issuance (effective expiry is min of the two)"
+    },
+    "id": {
+      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId"
+    },
+    "is_valid": {
+      "description": "True only when `effective_status` is `active`. It is a restatement of that field, not a second opinion: expiry is decided once, inside the derivation above"
+    },
+    "issued_at": {},
+    "principal": {
+      "description": "The proven domain that authorized the delegate — derived from the control proof, never client input"
+    },
+    "revoked_at": {},
+    "revoked_reason": {},
+    "scope": {},
+    "status": {
+      "description": "The owner's OWN record — whether they revoked this delegation themselves. Nothing else writes it: neither the control proof dying nor this delegation's own lifetime running out. Liveness is DERIVED and reported separately as `effective_status`. This stored field is also what `?status=` filters on"
+    }
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}

Changed1 schema field changedOct 26, 2026
- removedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Removed value: -false
```
First observedSep 19, 2026

TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The annotations only say destructive/not-read-only; the description supplies far more: the blast radius is bounded (domain control proof and siblings survive), the revocation is mirrored into the proof registry so CRL, status list and public lookup all reflect it, repeat calls are idempotent and return the same body, and the result contrasts with PROOF's already_revoked behavior. This is exactly the extra context annotations cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the action and its scope, then idempotency, then return semantics. Dense but every clause carries information; the 'unlike a PROOF' parenthesis is slightly compressed but not wasteful.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, 2-parameter mutation with an existing output schema, the description covers scope, side effects, idempotency, auth prerequisite and the derived effective_status/is_valid field. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it safely is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% — both parameters document themselves, including the delegation ID pattern and the reason enum — so the schema does the heavy lifting and the baseline applies. The description only adds that the ph_dlg_ handle form also works through revoke_proof; it says nothing about what each revocation reason implies or any default.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening 'Revoke ONE delegation' gives a specific verb and resource with an explicit scope qualifier (singular). It goes further by stating what is NOT affected (the domain control proof and sibling delegations), which an agent can use to distinguish this from revoke_proof and the other revoke_* siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It clearly routes the agent: revoking a delegation here, versus revoke_proof for a PROOF, and it explicitly explains the idempotency difference between the two paths. It also supplies an access prerequisite (Proof account, authenticate this client, start_login does not open this tool). What it lacks is explicit guidance on when to prefer this over get_delegation/verify_delegation or how to handle bulk revocation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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