Proof Holdings

revoke_asset

Destructive

Revoke the proofs of one of your assets (a phone, email or domain) — the asset stays on the account. Owner only: sign in with start_login (a connection with only an API key is refused user_session_required — a key revokes a proof with revoke_proof instead), then one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type revocation_bulk and targets [this asset id], wait_for_2fa, and call again. A phone or email: every proof of that number or address is revoked; signing in with it again issues a fresh proof. A domain you own: every proof of the domain and every delegation issued from it are revoked for good, and the domain needs re-verification — re-verifying does NOT bring the delegations back. Need a temporary stop for a domain proof? Use suspend_proof instead. Status-checking verifiers see the revocation within about a minute; signature-only verifiers accept a token until it expires. Cannot be undone.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "revoke_asset"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`id`	Yes	Asset ID

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`type`	No
`notice`	No
`outcome`	No	`not_found` is also the answer for an asset the account does not own.
`success`	No	Always `true`
`asset_id`	No
`identifier`	No	Masked for phones and emails; a domain travels in clear.
`domain_status`	No	Domains only: `reverification_required` — the domain stays on the account and needs re-verification before anything can be issued from it.
`revoked_asset_ids`	No	Every asset of the same identifier this call revoked with it, the named one included — a phone holds one asset per channel, a domain one per verification.
`delegations_revoked`	No	Domains only: the delegations revoked with the proofs. Re-verifying does not bring them back.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedNov 2, 2026

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": {},
+  "properties": {
+    "asset_id": {},
+    "delegations_revoked": {
+      "description": "Domains only: the delegations revoked with the proofs. Re-verifying does not bring them back."
+    },
+    "domain_status": {
+      "description": "Domains only: `reverification_required` — the domain stays on the account and needs re-verification before anything can be issued from it."
+    },
+    "identifier": {
+      "description": "Masked for phones and emails; a domain travels in clear."
+    },
+    "notice": {},
+    "outcome": {
+      "description": "`not_found` is also the answer for an asset the account does not own."
+    },
+    "revoked_asset_ids": {
+      "description": "Every asset of the same identifier this call revoked with it, the named one included — a phone holds one asset per channel, a domain one per verification."
+    },
+    "success": {
+      "description": "Always `true`"
+    },
+    "type": {}
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}

Changed1 schema field changedOct 26, 2026
- removedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Removed value: -false
```
First observedSep 19, 2026

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare destructiveHint=true; the description goes far beyond by explaining that phone/email proofs can be re-issued while domain revocations kill delegations permanently, that re-verification does not restore delegations, propagation timing (~1 minute), and that the action cannot be undone. This is exactly the irreversible-consequence context an agent needs before invoking a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action and its irreversibility are front-loaded, and every sentence carries distinct information (auth, sequencing, per-asset-type outcomes, alternatives). It is dense and reads long, but almost no sentence is filler, so it stays efficient for a destructive tool.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, the description doesn't need to explain return values, and it fully covers auth requirements, the multi-step 2FA flow, per-asset-type consequences, and alternatives. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single 'id' param is documented as 'Asset ID'. The description adds usable semantics by clarifying it is passed as targets [this asset id] in the 2FA step, slightly beyond schema. Marginal gain keeps it at 4 rather than 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Revoke the proofs of one of your assets') and immediately bounds the effect ('the asset stays on the account'), which distinguishes it from delete/remove siblings. An agent can tell this apart from revoke_proof and suspend_proof without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly names prerequisites (owner only, start_login), the alternative for API-key connections (revoke_proof), and the temporary alternative for domains (suspend_proof). It also lays out the exact 2FA sequence (start_2fa_for_action with action_type revocation_bulk, wait_for_2fa, call again), leaving nothing to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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