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revoke_asset

Destructive

Revoke the proofs of one of your assets (a phone, email or domain) — the asset stays on the account. Owner only: sign in with start_login (a connection with only an API key is refused user_session_required — a key revokes a proof with revoke_proof instead), then one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type revocation_bulk and targets [this asset id], wait_for_2fa, and call again. A phone or email: every proof of that number or address is revoked; signing in with it again issues a fresh proof. A domain you own: every proof of the domain and every delegation issued from it are revoked for good, and the domain needs re-verification — re-verifying does NOT bring the delegations back. Need a temporary stop for a domain proof? Use suspend_proof instead. Status-checking verifiers see the revocation within about a minute; signature-only verifiers accept a token until it expires. Cannot be undone.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesAsset ID

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations flag it as destructive, but the description goes well beyond them: it discloses the auth requirement (user_session_required vs API-key path), the 2FA action_type/targets flow, the irreversible nature ('Cannot be undone'), the domain re-verification consequence (delegations not restored), and the propagation timing (~1 minute for status-checking verifiers).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and the sibling routing are front-loaded, and the dense procedural sentences (2FA flow, domain consequences, propagation) each carry information an agent needs. It is long, but nearly every clause is load-bearing for a destructive, multi-step operation.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive one-param tool with no output schema, the description supplies the full picture: auth path, 2FA sequence, blast radius per asset type, reversibility, and verifier timing. Nothing material is left for the agent to infer.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% for the single 'id' parameter ('Asset ID'), so the baseline is 3. The description reinforces that the id is the asset being revoked ('targets [this asset id]') but adds no format or syntax detail beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb+resource and an explicit scope distinction: 'Revoke the proofs of one of your assets... the asset stays on the account,' which separates it from asset-deletion tools. It further names the neighboring tools revoke_proof and suspend_proof, so an agent can place it precisely among siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit when-to-use routing: use revoke_proof if you only hold an API key, use suspend_proof for a temporary stop on a domain proof, and use revoke_asset for permanent revocation. It also states the preconditions (owner sign-in via start_login, then 2FA via start_2fa_for_action/wait_for_2fa).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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