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request_hitl_authorization

Request authorization for a HITL config. Sends consent requests to all configured channels (Telegram/WhatsApp). Users must approve before confirmations can be sent.

Agent usage: This must be completed before create_confirmation will work for this HITL config. The consent request is DELIVERED to each channel — the response carries no link to show. It returns authorizations — one entry per resolved recipient, each with its channel, recipient, authorization_id and status — plus a message. Read the entries rather than assuming: status: 'pending' means consent was just sent and the user must approve in Telegram/WhatsApp itself, while status: 'active' means that recipient had already authorized and nothing was sent to them. An EMPTY array does not mean everyone is authorized — it means no recipient could be resolved at all (usually a HITL config bound to a missing or inactive circle, or channels whose recipient is blank), so nobody was asked and waiting for an approval would hang forever. Do not relay message on that branch: it reads 'All channels already have active or pending authorizations', which is exactly the wrong conclusion. Read the array. After requesting, you can proceed once the user confirms they have approved.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "request_hitl_authorization"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesHITL config ID to request authorization for

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
hitl_idYesMongoDB ObjectId
messageYes
authorizationsYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": {},
      +  "description": "Response from requesting authorization consent for HITL channels",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "authorizations": {
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": {},
      +        "properties": {
      +          "authorization_id": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "channel": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "recipient": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "status": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "required": [
      +          "channel",
      +          "recipient",
      +          "authorization_id",
      +          "status"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "hitl_id": {
      +      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "message": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "hitl_id",
      +    "authorizations",
      +    "message"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes far beyond the annotations by disclosing that consent requests are delivered out-of-band, that no link is returned, and that responses include an authorizations array plus a message. It explains the critical trap that an empty array means no recipient was resolved and that the accompanying message can read misleadingly, which is exactly the kind of behavioral context annotations do not provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose and prerequisite are front-loaded, and most sentences carry actionable detail, especially the response-reading warnings. It is somewhat long and could be tightened, but the length is justified by the important edge cases it documents.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given that an output schema exists, the description still adds essential interpretation guidance for the returned authorizations array and the misleading message branch. It also includes authentication requirements, making it complete enough for an agent to invoke and interpret the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is only one parameter, and schema coverage is 100% with a description already identifying it as the HITL config ID. The prose adds context that the ID determines which config is authorized, but does not add meaningful syntax or format detail beyond the schema, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Uses a specific verb and resource: requests authorization for a HITL config and sends consent requests across configured channels. It also distinguishes its sequencing role relative to create_confirmation, so the agent can tell exactly what this tool does and where it sits in the flow.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states this must be completed before create_confirmation will work, and explains what to do after requesting: proceed only once the user confirms approval. The 'Agent usage' section gives clear when-to-use and sequencing guidance rather than leaving the agent to infer it.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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