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remove_email

Destructive

Remove an email address from the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type email_remove and targets [this email id]. Revokes every proof of the address and your own consents naming it, declines pending confirmations waiting on it, moves Lookalike Watch alerts to your remaining primary email (or stops the watch when none is left), deletes the record, signs out your other devices, and names the new primary email. Refused for the address you signed in with and for your only way to sign in. Cannot be undone.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesEmail record ID

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations (readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=true) are consistent and the description goes far beyond them: revoking proofs and consents, declining pending confirmations, relocating Lookalike Watch alerts, signing out other devices, naming the new primary email, and explicit irreversibility ('Cannot be undone'). This is exactly the behavioral context an agent needs before an irreversible mutation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads what the tool does, then the prerequisite, then the consequence chain, then access — a logical order with no filler. The side-effect sentence is dense and long, but every clause describes a distinct irreversible effect on the account, so it earns its length.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, no-output-schema, single-param tool, the definition covers purpose, precondition flow, refusal cases, full outcome set, and auth requirements. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it safely is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with a single 'id' parameter, so baseline is 3. The description adds meaning by tying the id to the 2FA target list ('targets [this email id]'), clarifying how the parameter is consumed across the required pre-step rather than just what it is.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a precise verb+resource ('Remove an email address from the account') and immediately scopes it against the rest of the toolset. The detailed side-effect list makes it unmistakable versus siblings like remove_phone, revoke_proof, or delete_profile.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly names the prerequisite tool and its arguments ('start_2fa_for_action with action_type email_remove and targets [this email id]') and states the exact refusal conditions (the signed-in address, the only sign-in method). It also documents authentication requirements and the Claude Code auth path.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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