Proof Holdings

get_webhook_endpoint

Read-only

Get one webhook endpoint by ID. The signing secret is not returned (only create_webhook_endpoint and rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret return it).

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "get_webhook_endpoint"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`id`	Yes	Webhook endpoint ID

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	No	MongoDB ObjectId
`url`	No	HTTPS URL deliveries are POSTed to, at most 2000 characters. Private, loopback and link-local addresses are refused.
`scope`	No	`all` — every sub-account, present and future, plus account-level events. `selected` — only the sub-accounts in `profile_ids`; account-level events never reach it.
`events`	No
`legacy`	No	The endpoint converted from the account's single webhook URL — the one the deprecated `/me/settings` webhook block reads and writes.
`status`	No	A `disabled` endpoint receives nothing; its history and secret are kept.
`created_at`	No
`secret_set`	No	Whether the endpoint has a signing secret (always true).
`updated_at`	No
`description`	No
`profile_ids`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

AddedNov 2, 2026

TDQS

A4.3/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already mark it read-only; the description adds meaningful behavior by stating the signing secret is not returned and by explaining the Proof account authentication requirement. It does not cover error behavior or the shape of the returned endpoint, but the output schema exists to handle that.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the core operation in one sentence, then adds only the secret-return caveat and access instruction. No unnecessary repetition or filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple read-only single-record lookup with a fully covered schema and an output schema, this is complete. It covers authentication and the important secret-exposure nuance an agent would otherwise need to infer.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single id parameter is already described in the schema as 'Webhook endpoint ID' with a pattern. The description only adds 'by ID', so baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: 'Get one webhook endpoint by ID.' It distinguishes single-endpoint retrieval from sibling listing and notes that signing secrets are only exposed by create_webhook_endpoint and rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clearly indicates this tool is for retrieving one endpoint by ID and names create/rotate as the alternatives for obtaining signing secrets. It also gives authentication guidance and warns that start_login does not open this tool, though it does not explicitly contrast with list_webhook_endpoints.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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