Proof Holdings

get_webhook_delivery

Read-only

Get details of a single webhook delivery attempt including request/response payloads and retry history.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "get_webhook_delivery"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`id`	Yes	Webhook delivery ID

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	Yes	MongoDB ObjectId
`url`	Yes
`status`	Yes	Delivery status
`payload`	Yes	The event body as stored. Every `proof_token` in it is null: the body POSTed to the receiver carries the token, read from its record at send time, and delivery history keeps no copy.
`attempts`	Yes
`created_at`	Yes
`event_type`	Yes	Type of webhook event. `proof.suspended`/`proof.unsuspended` fire for a delegation (`ph_dlg_`) lifecycle act on the account's own configured webhook_url — not a channel to a separately-addressed delegate (h-fix-delegation-suspend-governance). `proof.reissued`/`delegation.reissued` say a stored token was re-signed under a new key: a reference only (`proof_id` or `handle`, `kid`, `reissued_at`, `token_url`, and the `profile_id` every body carries), never the token; `proof.` does not cover `delegation.reissued`.
`profile_id`	Yes	The sub-account whose event it was. Null for an account-level event, and for deliveries recorded before #421.
`updated_at`	Yes
`endpoint_id`	Yes	The webhook endpoint it was sent to. Null for a request's `callback_url` and for a delivery to the account's settings webhook URL before the switch-over to endpoints.
`delivered_at`	Yes
`max_attempts`	Yes
`error_message`	Yes
`next_retry_at`	Yes
`response_body`	Yes	The receiver's response body.
`last_attempt_at`	Yes
`response_status`	Yes
`token_omitted_reason`	No	Why the last send carried `proof_token: null`. Every attempt, the first included, sends the token the delivery was queued with, or null: a retried delivery carries the same `proof_token` as the first attempt or `proof_token: null`, never a different token. `source_gone`: the record holding the token no longer exists, or (for a delivery stored before tokens were left out of history) could not be identified. `token_absent`: it holds no token, or there was none when the delivery was queued. `token_changed`: its token is no longer the one the delivery was queued with (re-issued or changed since). Null when every token was sent. Absent from an API that predates it.
`verification_request_id`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedNov 5, 2026

changedOutput schema / properties / event_type / description

Previous value: -"Type of webhook event. `proof.suspended`/`proof.unsuspended` fire for a delegation (`ph_dlg_*`) lifecycle act on the account's own configured webhook_url — not a channel to a separately-addressed delegate (h-fix-delegation-suspend-governance)."New value: +"Type of webhook event. `proof.suspended`/`proof.unsuspended` fire for a delegation (`ph_dlg_*`) lifecycle act on the account's own configured webhook_url — not a channel to a separately-addressed delegate (h-fix-delegation-suspend-governance). `proof.reissued`/`delegation.reissued` say a stored token was re-signed under a new key: a reference only (`proof_id` or `handle`, `kid`, `reissued_at`, `token_url`, and the `profile_id` every body carries), never the token; `proof.*` does not cover `delegation.reissued`."

Changed1 schema field changedNov 2, 2026

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": {},
+  "description": "Webhook delivery record",
+  "properties": {
+    "attempts": {
+      "maximum": 9007199254740991,
+      "minimum": -9007199254740991,
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "created_at": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "delivered_at": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "endpoint_id": {
+      "description": "The webhook endpoint it was sent to. Null for a request's `callback_url` and for a delivery to the account's settings webhook URL before the switch-over to endpoints.",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "error_message": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "event_type": {
+      "description": "Type of webhook event. `proof.suspended`/`proof.unsuspended` fire for a delegation (`ph_dlg_*`) lifecycle act on the account's own configured webhook_url — not a channel to a separately-addressed delegate (h-fix-delegation-suspend-governance).",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "id": {
+      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "last_attempt_at": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "max_attempts": {
+      "maximum": 9007199254740991,
+      "minimum": -9007199254740991,
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "next_retry_at": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "payload": {
+      "additionalProperties": {},
+      "description": "The event body as stored. Every `proof_token` in it is null: the body POSTed to the receiver carries the token, read from its record at send time, and delivery history keeps no copy.",
+      "properties": {},
+      "type": "object"
+    },
+    "profile_id": {
+      "description": "The sub-account whose event it was. Null for an account-level event, and for deliveries recorded before #421.",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "response_body": {
+      "description": "The receiver's response body.",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "response_status": {
+      "anyOf": [
+        {
+          "maximum": 9007199254740991,
+          "minimum": -9007199254740991,
+          "type": "integer"
+        },
+        {
+          "type": "null"
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    "status": {
+      "description": "Delivery status",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "token_omitted_reason": {
+      "description": "Why the last send carried `proof_token: null`. Every attempt, the first included, sends the token the delivery was queued with, or null: a retried delivery carries the same `proof_token` as the first attempt or `proof_token: null`, never a different token. `source_gone`: the record holding the token no longer exists, or (for a delivery stored before tokens were left out of history) could not be identified. `token_absent`: it holds no token, or there was none when the delivery was queued. `token_changed`: its token is no longer the one the delivery was queued with (re-issued or changed since). Null when every token was sent. Absent from an API that predates it.",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "updated_at": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "url": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "verification_request_id": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "id",
+    "verification_request_id",
+    "endpoint_id",
+    "profile_id",
+    "event_type",
+    "url",
+    "status",
+    "attempts",
+    "max_attempts",
+    "last_attempt_at",
+    "next_retry_at",
+    "delivered_at",
+    "response_status",
+    "error_message",
+    "created_at",
+    "payload",
+    "response_body",
+    "updated_at"
+  ],
+  "type": "object"
+}

Changed1 schema field changedOct 26, 2026
- removedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Removed value: -false
```
First observedSep 19, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds real value beyond that by disclosing what the response contains (payloads and retry history) and by flagging the Proof-account authentication requirement, including the non-obvious note that start_login does not unlock this tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose sentence is front-loaded and waste-free. The ACCESS block is longer than the core description and slightly repetitive, but it carries a genuine precondition, so it mostly earns its space.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be spelled out, and the auth prerequisite is explicitly covered. For a single-parameter read tool this is close to complete; only the relationship to list_webhook_deliveries is left implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only one parameter, and the schema already documents it at 100% coverage ('Webhook delivery ID'). The description adds no format, sourcing, or lookup guidance beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Get details of a single webhook delivery attempt') and enumerates the payload contents (request/response payloads, retry history), which cleanly separates it from list_webhook_deliveries and retry_webhook_delivery.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The singular 'single delivery attempt' implies it is the follow-up to a list call, but no sibling is named and there is no explicit when-not guidance. The ACCESS paragraph gives an authentication precondition, which is useful but is not usage routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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