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delete_webhook_endpoint

Destructive

Delete a webhook endpoint. It receives no new events; deliveries already queued to it are still attempted, signed with the secret they were queued with. Cannot be undone.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_webhook_endpoint"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesWebhook endpoint ID

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, and the description goes well beyond them: it explains that the endpoint receives no new events but already-queued deliveries are still attempted and signed with the original secret, and that the action cannot be undone. That is exactly the partial-destruction semantics an agent needs before committing.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core behavior is front-loaded in one dense sentence, followed by irreversibility and then the access note. The access block is somewhat verbose and the 'start_login does NOT open this tool' phrasing is slightly awkward, but every part is actionable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter destructive tool with full annotations, a documented schema and an output schema, the description covers the remaining gaps: what survives deletion, irreversibility, and the authentication path. Nothing needed to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single parameter with 100% schema description coverage ('Webhook endpoint ID', 24-hex pattern), so the schema already does the work. The description adds nothing about the id beyond what the schema says; baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Delete a webhook endpoint'), which unambiguously separates it from get_webhook_endpoint, update_webhook_endpoint and rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret. It stops short of naming those siblings, but the verb carries the differentiation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the verb — remove an endpoint you no longer want — and the description adds a clear access prerequisite (Proof account, re-authenticate via /mcp, start_login does not work). However, it never states when to prefer this over alternatives such as rotating the endpoint secret or simply leaving the endpoint idle, nor any preconditions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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