Proof Holdings

delete_profile

Destructive

Delete a sub-account (profile). Revokes its API keys, archives the HITL setups and declines the pending requests created with its own keys, keeps its history but unlinks it, deletes its message templates, and retires its username for good. The last sub-account cannot be deleted; deleting the primary sub-account makes the oldest remaining one primary (the response names it). In a start_login session: one code first — start_2fa_for_action with action_type profile_delete and targets [this sub-account id]. With an API key alone only an EMPTY sub-account (no API keys, HITL setups or pending requests) can be deleted; anything else answers owner_session_required. archive_default_linked is deliberately not offered here: archiving or cancelling everything linked only by default is an irreversible fan-out, so archive each item explicitly instead. Cannot be undone.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "profile_id": "<profile_id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_profile"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`profile_id`	Yes	Profile ID

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`message`	No
`project`	No
`success`	No	Always `true`. The 1.x Go, PHP and Python SDK types carry it as a string, as released; it is typed boolean in the next major.
`new_primary`	No	Named when the deleted sub-account is (or was) the primary: the OLDEST remaining sub-account takes over, and messages sent without choosing a sub-account carry its name.
`was_primary`	No
`hitl_archived`	No
`hitl_detached`	No
`api_keys_revoked`	No
`circles_detached`	No
`domains_detached`	No
`username_retired`	No	The username is retired for good — it can never be claimed again, by anyone.
`requests_detached`	No
`templates_deleted`	No
`requests_cancelled`	No
`confirmations_denied`	No
`authorizations_revoked`	No
`verifications_detached`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedNov 2, 2026

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": {},
+  "properties": {
+    "api_keys_revoked": {},
+    "authorizations_revoked": {},
+    "circles_detached": {},
+    "confirmations_denied": {},
+    "domains_detached": {},
+    "hitl_archived": {},
+    "hitl_detached": {},
+    "message": {},
+    "new_primary": {
+      "description": "Named when the deleted sub-account is (or was) the primary: the OLDEST remaining sub-account takes over, and messages sent without choosing a sub-account carry its name."
+    },
+    "project": {},
+    "requests_cancelled": {},
+    "requests_detached": {},
+    "success": {
+      "description": "Always `true`. The 1.x Go, PHP and Python SDK types carry it as a string, as released; it is typed boolean in the next major."
+    },
+    "templates_deleted": {},
+    "username_retired": {
+      "description": "The username is retired for good — it can never be claimed again, by anyone."
+    },
+    "verifications_detached": {},
+    "was_primary": {}
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}

Changed1 schema field changedOct 26, 2026
- removedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Removed value: -false
```
First observedSep 19, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare destructiveHint=true; the description goes far beyond by itemizing exactly what is destroyed (API keys revoked, HITL setups archived, pending requests declined, templates deleted, username retired) versus preserved (history kept but unlinked). It also discloses the owner_session_required failure mode and the primary-promotion side effect naming the new primary in the response.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the operation and its cascade, then constraints, then auth, with no filler sentences. It is dense and long for a single-parameter tool, but nearly every clause carries operational weight — the archive_default_linked justification is the only slightly peripheral line, though it usefully stops the agent hunting for a parameter that doesn't exist.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, auth-gated tool this covers the full picture: cascade effects, irreversibility, the two auth paths, the empty-account restriction, and the promotion side effect. An output schema exists, so return values needn't be spelled out, and the description still notes the response names the new primary.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only one parameter, and schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents profile_id fully. The description adds marginal meaning by referring to 'targets [this sub-account id]' in the 2FA step, but gives no format or sourcing guidance (e.g. from list_profiles). Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb+resource ('Delete a sub-account (profile)') and immediately enumerates the cascade, so it is unmistakable against siblings like delete_circle, delete_template, or set_primary_profile. The parenthetical '(profile)' pins the resource to the same vocabulary used by create_profile/update_profile.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit preconditions and routing: 'In a start_login session: one code first — start_2fa_for_action with action_type profile_delete', plus the API-key-only path restricted to EMPTY sub-accounts. It also names an exclusion ('The last sub-account cannot be deleted') and explains why archive_default_linked is not offered, telling the agent to archive each item explicitly instead.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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