Proof Holdings

delete_domain

Destructive

Remove a domain from the account. Revokes every proof of the domain and every delegation issued from it (for good — re-adding the domain does not bring them back), deletes the domain and its records, and removes our _proof TXT record and the Resend sending domain where we can; the response lists what is left for you to remove by hand. Owner only, in a start_login session, with one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type domain_remove and targets [this domain id]. Need only a fresh proof? Revoke the proofs instead (revoke_asset), which keeps the domain. Cannot be undone.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_domain"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`id`	Yes	Domain ID to delete

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`domain`	No
`notice`	No
`success`	No	Always `true`. The 1.x Go, PHP and Python SDK types carry it as a string, as released; it is typed boolean in the next major.
`carriers`	No	Where the revoked delegations are still published (the `_mcp.<domain>` pointer, a delegate card) — bounded to a few delegations and a few seconds.
`external`	No
`proofs_revoked`	No
`delegations_revoked`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedNov 2, 2026

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": {},
+  "properties": {
+    "carriers": {
+      "description": "Where the revoked delegations are still published (the `_mcp.<domain>` pointer, a delegate card) — bounded to a few delegations and a few seconds."
+    },
+    "delegations_revoked": {},
+    "domain": {},
+    "external": {},
+    "notice": {},
+    "proofs_revoked": {},
+    "success": {
+      "description": "Always `true`. The 1.x Go, PHP and Python SDK types carry it as a string, as released; it is typed boolean in the next major."
+    }
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}

Changed1 schema field changedOct 26, 2026
- removedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Removed value: -false
```
First observedSep 19, 2026

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only say destructiveHint=true; the description adds the specifics that matter: irreversibility ("Cannot be undone" and re-adding does not restore proofs/delegations), external side effects (removing the _proof TXT record and Resend sending domain "where we can"), and the honest caveat that the response lists leftovers the caller must clean up manually. That is genuine value beyond the annotation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action, then consequences, then the alternative, then prerequisites. Every clause carries operational weight — the parenthetical about re-adding not restoring proofs and the leftover-cleanup note both change agent behavior. No filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an irreversible single-parameter mutation with an output schema, the description covers everything an agent needs: auth/session/2FA flow, destruction scope, external cleanup gaps, and the non-destructive alternative. Return-value detail is correctly left to the output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the sole parameter is documented as "Domain ID to delete", so the schema already carries the meaning. The description only implicitly reinforces it via "targets [this domain id]" in the 2FA step; it adds no format or provenance detail beyond the schema. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Remove a domain from the account") and immediately scopes the blast radius: proofs, delegations, records, _proof TXT record, Resend sending domain. It is clearly distinguished from the adjacent siblings delete_domain_verification and revoke_asset, which are named as different operations.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit when-not guidance: "Need only a fresh proof? Revoke the proofs instead (revoke_asset), which keeps the domain." It also spells out the full precondition chain (owner only, start_login session, start_2fa_for_action with action_type domain_remove and targets [this domain id]) so an agent knows exactly what must happen before calling.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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