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create_identity_challenge

Create a Proof-Me cross-channel identity challenge (CONFIRM) for an enrolled Circle member. The account holder approves/denies on a channel different from the one the suspicious contact reached the member on.

Agent usage: poll get_identity_challenge with the returned ID until it leaves pending (confirmed, denied, cancelled, failed, expired or revoked).

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
circle_idYesCircle that holds the member
member_idYesEnrolled Circle member initiating the check
suspicious_channelNoChannel the suspicious contact reached the member on; defaults to the member channel

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed6 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / properties / challenger_id
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "Enrolled challenger initiating the check",
      -  "pattern": "^[0-9a-fA-F]{24}$",
      -  "type": "string"
      -}
    • addedInput schema / properties / circle_id
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Circle that holds the member",
      +  "pattern": "^[0-9a-fA-F]{24}$",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • removedInput schema / properties / hitl_id
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "HITL config that holds the challenger",
      -  "pattern": "^[0-9a-fA-F]{24}$",
      -  "type": "string"
      -}
    • addedInput schema / properties / member_id
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Enrolled Circle member initiating the check",
      +  "pattern": "^[0-9a-fA-F]{24}$",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • changedInput schema / properties / suspicious_channel / description
      Previous value: -"Channel the suspicious contact reached the challenger on; defaults to the challenger channel"New value: +"Channel the suspicious contact reached the member on; defaults to the member channel"
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
      -  "hitl_id",
      -  "challenger_id"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "circle_id",
      +  "member_id"
      +]
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Adds real context beyond the annotations (readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false): the tool creates a pending challenge that a human approves/denies out-of-band, that it requires an authenticated Proof account, and that it stays pending until one of six terminal states. Auth requirements and lifecycle are disclosed. It stops short of describing expiry timing, notification behavior, or idempotency, so not a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short, well-front-loaded blocks: purpose, agent usage, access. Each sentence carries information, though the ACCESS paragraph is slightly tangential to the tool's semantics and could be tighter.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description usefully compensates by telling the agent the returned ID is the polling handle and enumerating terminal states. Missing only failure/timeout expectations and the shape of the returned object, which keeps it at 4 for a stateful multi-step tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is already 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds genuine meaning to suspicious_channel by explaining it drives which channel the approval must come from ('different from the one the suspicious contact reached the member on') — the security-relevant relationship the schema alone does not convey.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a precise verb and resource ('Create a Proof-Me cross-channel identity challenge (CONFIRM) for an enrolled Circle member') and explains the mechanism — the holder approves on a different channel than the suspicious contact used. It is specific, but it does not explicitly contrast itself with lookalike siblings such as create_multi_channel_verification, create_confirmation, or create_hitl.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear operational context: use for an enrolled Circle member whose suspicious contact needs cross-channel confirmation, then poll get_identity_challenge with the returned ID until it leaves pending. It names the follow-up tool and terminal states, but never states when NOT to use this versus other verification/confirmation creation tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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