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create_identity_challenge

Create a Proof-Me cross-channel identity challenge (CONFIRM) for an enrolled Circle member. The account holder approves/denies on a channel different from the one the suspicious contact reached the member on.

Agent usage: poll get_identity_challenge with the returned ID until it leaves pending (confirmed, denied, cancelled, failed, expired or revoked).

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "circle_id": "<circle_id>",
      "member_id": "<member_id>"
    },
    "name": "create_identity_challenge"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
circle_idYesCircle that holds the member
member_idYesEnrolled Circle member initiating the check
suspicious_channelNoChannel the suspicious contact reached the member on; defaults to the member channel

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYes
statusYesThe one status every read reports. `pending` — waiting for the person being checked; `confirmed` — they confirmed; `denied` — they denied; `cancelled` — whoever started the check withdrew it; `failed` — the check could not be delivered; `expired` — nobody answered in time; `revoked` / `suspended` — the confirmation's proof was revoked or suspended (`POST /proofs/{proof_id}/revoke` or `/suspend`; revoking a denial's proof leaves it `denied`), or — `revoked` only — the member being checked was removed from the Circle while the check was still pending, which leaves `proof_id` null. Removing a member is not guaranteed to revoke a confirmation they already gave; revoke that one by its `proof_id`. A proof that merely reached its own expiry still reads `confirmed`; whether its token is still valid is `POST /proofs/validate`'s answer.
channelNoChannel the CONFIRM was dispatched on (GET)
is_drillNoTrue for a drill (scheduled, or started from the dashboard) rather than a real check (GET)
proof_idNoPublic handle of the decision's proof — what `POST /proofs/{proof_id}/revoke` takes. Null until a decision minted one (GET).
circle_idNoThe Circle the check belongs to (GET)
created_atNoISO 8601 timestamp
expires_atNoISO 8601 timestamp
proof_tokenNoSigned proof token, present once the person being checked decided
resolved_atNoISO 8601 timestamp of the decision — the CONFIRM, the DENY, the cancellation or the delivery failure — or null while the check is unanswered and after a timeout.
confirm_channelNoChannel the CONFIRM was dispatched on (POST)
single_channel_warningNoTrue when the account holder has only one channel, so the CONFIRM ran on the same channel as the suspicious contact (degraded)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": {},
      +  "description": "An identity challenge (Proof of Me)",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "channel": {
      +      "description": "Channel the CONFIRM was dispatched on (GET)",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "circle_id": {
      +      "description": "The Circle the check belongs to (GET)",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "confirm_channel": {
      +      "description": "Channel the CONFIRM was dispatched on (POST)",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "created_at": {
      +      "description": "ISO 8601 timestamp",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "expires_at": {
      +      "description": "ISO 8601 timestamp",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "id": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "is_drill": {
      +      "description": "True for a drill (scheduled, or started from the dashboard) rather than a real check (GET)",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "proof_id": {
      +      "description": "Public handle of the decision's proof — what `POST /proofs/{proof_id}/revoke` takes. Null until a decision minted one (GET).",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "proof_token": {
      +      "description": "Signed proof token, present once the person being checked decided",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "resolved_at": {
      +      "description": "ISO 8601 timestamp of the decision — the CONFIRM, the DENY, the cancellation or the delivery failure — or null while the check is unanswered and after a timeout.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "single_channel_warning": {
      +      "description": "True when the account holder has only one channel, so the CONFIRM ran on the same channel as the suspicious contact (degraded)",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "status": {
      +      "description": "The one status every read reports. `pending` — waiting for the person being checked; `confirmed` — they confirmed; `denied` — they denied; `cancelled` — whoever started the check withdrew it; `failed` — the check could not be delivered; `expired` — nobody answered in time; `revoked` / `suspended` — the confirmation's proof was revoked or suspended (`POST /proofs/{proof_id}/revoke` or `/suspend`; revoking a denial's proof leaves it `denied`), or — `revoked` only — the member being checked was removed from the Circle while the check was still pending, which leaves `proof_id` null. Removing a member is not guaranteed to revoke a confirmation they already gave; revoke that one by its `proof_id`. A proof that merely reached its own expiry still reads `confirmed`; whether its token is still valid is `POST /proofs/validate`'s answer.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "id",
      +    "status"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
  3. Changed6 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / properties / challenger_id
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "Enrolled challenger initiating the check",
      -  "pattern": "^[0-9a-fA-F]{24}$",
      -  "type": "string"
      -}
    • addedInput schema / properties / circle_id
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Circle that holds the member",
      +  "pattern": "^[0-9a-fA-F]{24}$",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • removedInput schema / properties / hitl_id
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "HITL config that holds the challenger",
      -  "pattern": "^[0-9a-fA-F]{24}$",
      -  "type": "string"
      -}
    • addedInput schema / properties / member_id
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Enrolled Circle member initiating the check",
      +  "pattern": "^[0-9a-fA-F]{24}$",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • changedInput schema / properties / suspicious_channel / description
      Previous value: -"Channel the suspicious contact reached the challenger on; defaults to the challenger channel"New value: +"Channel the suspicious contact reached the member on; defaults to the member channel"
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
      -  "hitl_id",
      -  "challenger_id"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "circle_id",
      +  "member_id"
      +]
  4. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes meaningfully beyond the annotations (readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false): it reveals this is an async, human-approval operation with a terminal-state lifecycle (confirmed, denied, cancelled, failed, expired, revoked) and that authentication is required before the call can succeed. That lifecycle and auth disclosure is exactly the context annotations don't carry. No return-format detail, but an output schema exists.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads purpose, then a labeled 'Agent usage' follow-up and a clearly separated 'ACCESS' prerequisite block, so an agent can scan the three concerns independently. Slightly long, but each block earns its place; no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a mutating, async, authenticated tool, the description covers the trigger, the required follow-up polling, the terminal states to poll for, and the auth prerequisite — and an output schema exists so return values need not be explained. It is essentially complete, with only the sibling-boundary guidance missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline would be 3, but the description adds real meaning: it clarifies the suspicious_channel parameter's purpose (the channel the suspicious contact reached the member on, contrasted against the member channel) and frames circle_id/member_id around an 'enrolled' member. This is semantic context the schema's terse parameter descriptions don't fully supply.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Create a Proof-Me cross-channel identity challenge (CONFIRM) for an enrolled Circle member') and adds the mechanism (approval on a different channel than the suspicious contact used), so the agent knows exactly what operation this performs. It stops short of explicitly naming the sibling it is not (e.g. create_confirmation or create_multi_channel_verification), so an agent still has to infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly prescribes the follow-up workflow: 'poll get_identity_challenge with the returned ID until it leaves pending'. It also gives a concrete precondition for calling it at all (needs a Proof account; authenticate this client, and start_login does NOT open this tool). It lacks guidance on when to choose this over create_confirmation/create_multi_channel_verification.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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