Proof Holdings

create_confirmation

Create a HITL confirmation request. Sends an approval request to the channels configured on the referenced HITL config. First response wins.

Agent usage: The HITL config referenced by hitl_id must be authorized before you can create confirmations. If this returns a 403 or "not authorized" error, call request_hitl_authorization on the HITL config first, then wait for the user to approve via the messaging channel. After creating a confirmation, poll get_confirmation to check for approval/denial, or, if the user (the HITL config owner) will decide it themselves, use get_confirmation_approval_link for their own approval link.

Encryption is NOT optional: a HITL config cannot send confirmations without a keypair, the human approves by decrypting in their browser, and message must be a JSON ciphertext envelope. Plaintext is refused with 400 message_not_encrypted; an envelope sealed to another key with 400 message_key_mismatch. Choose the version by who must be able to decrypt:

v1 (single-recipient): wraps the content key for the config owner only. Use ONLY when there are no enrolled non-owner approvers — with approvers enrolled it is refused with 400 envelope_missing_approvers.
v2 (multi-recipient): additionally wraps the content key for each enrolled approver via an approver_ek map, so every approver can decrypt. Build it with the SDK encryptMessageV2(plaintext, ownerPublicKey, hitlId, approverKeys) after fetching the approvers via the SDK getApproverKeys(hitlId) (GET /api/v1/hitl/:id/approver-keys). AAD is the hitlId.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "hitl_id": "<hitl_id>",
      "message": "<message>"
    },
    "name": "create_confirmation"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`hitl_id`	Yes	HITL config ID whose channels will receive the approval request
`message`	Yes	The client-encrypted ciphertext envelope as a JSON string (v1 or v2) — NOT the human-readable text. Encrypt the sentence the approver should read; passing it directly is refused with 400 `message_not_encrypted`, because the approval page can only decrypt an envelope.
`proof_expiry_days`	No	Per-request proof expiry override in days (7, 30, 90, or 365)

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	No	MongoDB ObjectId
`status`	No	Status of a confirmation request. A confirmation that times out is `denied`, with `response.channel` `system` and `response.text` `timeout`.
`hitl_id`	No
`message`	No	The stored ciphertext envelope, echoed back verbatim. The server never sees the plaintext, so this is never the human sentence — the approver decrypts it in their browser.
`resends`	No	Every "Send again" (`POST /confirmations/{id}/resend`), oldest first, the last 50 kept. Absent from an API that predates it.
`response`	No	The decision and its evidence (null while pending)
`created_at`	No
`timeout_at`	No	When this confirmation will time out
`updated_at`	No
`proof_token`	No	Signed proof of the decision, approval or denial alike, naming who decided (`decided_by`, plus `authorization_id` for an approver); null while pending and for a system denial (`response.channel` is `system`)
`resolved_at`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedNov 2, 2026

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": {},
+  "properties": {
+    "created_at": {},
+    "hitl_id": {},
+    "id": {
+      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId"
+    },
+    "message": {
+      "description": "The stored ciphertext envelope, echoed back verbatim. The server never sees the plaintext, so this is never the human sentence — the approver decrypts it in their browser."
+    },
+    "proof_token": {
+      "description": "Signed proof of the decision, approval or denial alike, naming who decided (`decided_by`, plus `authorization_id` for an approver); null while pending and for a system denial (`response.channel` is `system`)"
+    },
+    "resends": {
+      "description": "Every \"Send again\" (`POST /confirmations/{id}/resend`), oldest first, the last 50 kept. Absent from an API that predates it."
+    },
+    "resolved_at": {},
+    "response": {
+      "description": "The decision and its evidence (null while pending)"
+    },
+    "status": {
+      "description": "Status of a confirmation request. A confirmation that times out is `denied`, with `response.channel` `system` and `response.text` `timeout`."
+    },
+    "timeout_at": {
+      "description": "When this confirmation will time out"
+    },
+    "updated_at": {}
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}

Changed3 schema fields changedOct 26, 2026
- removedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Removed value: -false
```
- addedInput schema / properties / proof_expiry_days / maximum
```
Added value: +9007199254740991
```
- addedInput schema / properties / proof_expiry_days / minimum
```
Added value: +-9007199254740991
```

Changed2 schema fields changedSep 23, 2026

changedInput schema / properties / message / description

Previous value: -"Human-readable description of what needs approval"New value: +"The client-encrypted ciphertext envelope as a JSON string (v1 or v2) — NOT the human-readable text. Encrypt the sentence the approver should read; passing it directly is refused with 400 `message_not_encrypted`, because the approval page can only decrypt an envelope."

changedInput schema / properties / message / maxLength
```
Previous value: -2000New value: +10000
```

First observedSep 19, 2026

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, the description discloses critical behavior: the HITL config must be authorized, encryption is mandatory, plaintext is rejected with message_not_encrypted, and key mismatches return message_key_mismatch. It also explains v1 vs v2 envelope choice and the exact 400 refusal conditions, which are essential for correct invocation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with purpose and agent workflow, then uses bullets for the encryption-version distinctions. It is dense and lengthy, but the length is largely justified by the non-obvious auth and encryption requirements; minor trimming could still improve scanability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity, the description covers the core workflow, auth prerequisite, error handling, encryption requirements, and post-creation paths. An output schema exists, so the description does not need to explain return values, and it is otherwise sufficiently complete for correct use.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all parameters, and the description adds substantial meaning for hitl_id and especially message by explaining the required ciphertext envelope and v1/v2 construction. It does not add much about proof_expiry_days beyond the schema, so it is not a full 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: create a HITL confirmation request that sends an approval request to channels configured on the referenced HITL config. It also adds the key behavior 'First response wins,' making the operation concrete and distinguishable from simple get/list confirmation tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly explains the required authorization precondition, names request_hitl_authorization when a 403 occurs, and tells the agent to wait for user approval. It also distinguishes follow-up paths: poll get_confirmation, or use get_confirmation_approval_link when the HITL config owner will approve themselves.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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