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connect_cloudflare

Destructive

Connect a Cloudflare API token to a domain for automated DNS record management. Note: the API token will be visible in the AI conversation context.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>",
      "api_token": "<api_token>"
    },
    "name": "connect_cloudflare"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesDomain ID
api_tokenYesCloudflare API token with DNS edit permissions

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesMongoDB ObjectId
domainYes
resendNoEmail-sending setup for a domain. Present once email sending has been set up.
statusYesDomain verification status. `verifying` while a check runs; `revoking` while the owner's removal or revocation cascade holds the domain; `reverification_required` after a revoked proof, until control is shown again.
proof_idNoPublic handle of the control proof backing this domain (`ph_ctl_<32 hex>`), resolved through the domain's mirroring asset — the same source `GET /me/assets` reads, so the two surfaces cannot disagree. Null when the domain has no proof, or when its proof predates the registry.
providerNoNever sent; read `detected_provider`. Kept for released SDK types; removed in the next major.
oauth_urlNoSent only by the add when Cloudflare sign-in is configured for the detected provider.
created_atYes
from_emailNo
profile_idNoMongoDB ObjectId
updated_atYes
check_countYes
dns_recordsYes
verified_atNo
proof_statusNoRegistry status of that proof. A domain row can read `verified` while its proof is `revoked` — the row records that control was once shown, the proof records whether it still stands — so a client showing domain control must render THIS. Null means no registry record, which is NOT a revocation.
error_messageNoWhy the last check failed.
provider_nameYes
http_file_pathYes
actual_dns_hostNoThe host serving the zone, when it differs from the provider that verified it.
last_checked_atNo
oauth_connectedYesWhether a Cloudflare connection is stored for this domain.
txt_record_nameYes
for_verificationYes
has_dns_mismatchYes
proof_expires_atNoWhen that proof expires — the signed token's own `exp`. `proof_status` stays `active` after this instant (nothing rewrites it), so a client must compare against the clock to tell a live proof from an expired one. Proofs inside 30 days of expiry are renewed automatically while control can still be confirmed. Carried even when `proof_id` is null (a proof that predates the registry still has a signed expiry); null when the domain has no proof, or its proof never stored one.
supports_api_keyYes
txt_record_valueYes
detected_providerYesThe DNS provider read from the nameservers; `unknown` when none matched.
for_email_sendingYes
godaddy_connectedYesWhether a GoDaddy connection is stored for this domain.
http_file_contentYes
supports_auto_dnsYesWhether the detected provider can create the verification record itself.
email_verificationNoAn email verification of the domain. The code itself is never returned.
supports_api_tokenYes
verified_providersYesEvery provider (or `email`) that has confirmed control.
verification_methodYes`auto_dns`, `manual_dns`, `http_file` or `email`.
actual_dns_host_nameNo
dns_mismatch_warningNoSent only while `has_dns_mismatch` is true.
proof_revoked_reasonNoReason the registry recorded, present only while `proof_status` is `revoked`.
verification_subtypeNoHow a provider verified the domain: by creating the record, or by confirming ownership without one.
email_sending_enabledNoNever sent; read `for_email_sending`. Kept for released SDK types; removed in the next major.
has_provider_credentialsNoSent only by the add: the account already holds credentials for the detected provider.
provider_credential_nameNoSent only by the add, with `has_provider_credentials`.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": {},
      +  "description": "Domain record",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "actual_dns_host": {
      +      "description": "The host serving the zone, when it differs from the provider that verified it.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "actual_dns_host_name": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "check_count": {
      +      "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +      "minimum": -9007199254740991,
      +      "type": "integer"
      +    },
      +    "created_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "detected_provider": {
      +      "description": "The DNS provider read from the nameservers; `unknown` when none matched.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "dns_mismatch_warning": {
      +      "description": "Sent only while `has_dns_mismatch` is true.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "dns_records": {
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": {},
      +        "properties": {
      +          "name": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "priority": {
      +            "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +            "minimum": -9007199254740991,
      +            "type": "integer"
      +          },
      +          "purpose": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "type": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "value": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "verified": {
      +            "type": "boolean"
      +          },
      +          "verified_at": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "required": [
      +          "type",
      +          "name",
      +          "value",
      +          "purpose",
      +          "verified"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "domain": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "email_sending_enabled": {
      +      "description": "Never sent; read `for_email_sending`. Kept for released SDK types; removed in the next major.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "email_verification": {
      +      "additionalProperties": {},
      +      "description": "An email verification of the domain. The code itself is never returned.",
      +      "properties": {
      +        "attempts": {
      +          "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +          "minimum": -9007199254740991,
      +          "type": "integer"
      +        },
      +        "email_address": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "email_prefix": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "expires_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "last_sent_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "verified_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        }
      +      },
      +      "required": [
      +        "email_prefix",
      +        "email_address",
      +        "expires_at",
      +        "attempts"
      +      ],
      +      "type": "object"
      +    },
      +    "error_message": {
      +      "description": "Why the last check failed.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "for_email_sending": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "for_verification": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "from_email": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "godaddy_connected": {
      +      "description": "Whether a GoDaddy connection is stored for this domain.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "has_dns_mismatch": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "has_provider_credentials": {
      +      "description": "Sent only by the add: the account already holds credentials for the detected provider.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "http_file_content": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "http_file_path": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "id": {
      +      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "last_checked_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "oauth_connected": {
      +      "description": "Whether a Cloudflare connection is stored for this domain.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "oauth_url": {
      +      "description": "Sent only by the add when Cloudflare sign-in is configured for the detected provider.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "profile_id": {
      +      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "proof_expires_at": {
      +      "description": "When that proof expires — the signed token's own `exp`. `proof_status` stays `active` after this instant (nothing rewrites it), so a client must compare against the clock to tell a live proof from an expired one. Proofs inside 30 days of expiry are renewed automatically while control can still be confirmed. Carried even when `proof_id` is null (a proof that predates the registry still has a signed expiry); null when the domain has no proof, or its proof never stored one.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "proof_id": {
      +      "description": "Public handle of the control proof backing this domain (`ph_ctl_<32 hex>`), resolved through the domain's mirroring asset — the same source `GET /me/assets` reads, so the two surfaces cannot disagree. Null when the domain has no proof, or when its proof predates the registry.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "proof_revoked_reason": {
      +      "description": "Reason the registry recorded, present only while `proof_status` is `revoked`.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "proof_status": {
      +      "description": "Registry status of that proof. A domain row can read `verified` while its proof is `revoked` — the row records that control was once shown, the proof records whether it still stands — so a client showing domain control must render THIS. Null means no registry record, which is NOT a revocation.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "provider": {
      +      "description": "Never sent; read `detected_provider`. Kept for released SDK types; removed in the next major.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "provider_credential_name": {
      +      "description": "Sent only by the add, with `has_provider_credentials`.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "provider_name": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "resend": {
      +      "additionalProperties": {},
      +      "description": "Email-sending setup for a domain. Present once email sending has been set up.",
      +      "properties": {
      +        "dkim_records": {
      +          "items": {
      +            "additionalProperties": {},
      +            "properties": {
      +              "name": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              },
      +              "priority": {
      +                "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +                "minimum": -9007199254740991,
      +                "type": "integer"
      +              },
      +              "purpose": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              },
      +              "type": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              },
      +              "value": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              },
      +              "verified": {
      +                "type": "boolean"
      +              },
      +              "verified_at": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              }
      +            },
      +            "required": [
      +              "type",
      +              "name",
      +              "value",
      +              "purpose",
      +              "verified"
      +            ],
      +            "type": "object"
      +          },
      +          "type": "array"
      +        },
      +        "domain_id": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "last_checked_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "registered_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "status": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "verified_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        }
      +      },
      +      "required": [
      +        "status",
      +        "dkim_records"
      +      ],
      +      "type": "object"
      +    },
      +    "status": {
      +      "description": "Domain verification status. `verifying` while a check runs; `revoking` while the owner's removal or revocation cascade holds the domain; `reverification_required` after a revoked proof, until control is shown again.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "supports_api_key": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "supports_api_token": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "supports_auto_dns": {
      +      "description": "Whether the detected provider can create the verification record itself.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "txt_record_name": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "txt_record_value": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "updated_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verification_method": {
      +      "description": "`auto_dns`, `manual_dns`, `http_file` or `email`.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verification_subtype": {
      +      "description": "How a provider verified the domain: by creating the record, or by confirming ownership without one.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verified_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verified_providers": {
      +      "description": "Every provider (or `email`) that has confirmed control.",
      +      "items": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "id",
      +    "domain",
      +    "status",
      +    "detected_provider",
      +    "provider_name",
      +    "supports_auto_dns",
      +    "verification_method",
      +    "for_email_sending",
      +    "for_verification",
      +    "dns_records",
      +    "has_dns_mismatch",
      +    "txt_record_name",
      +    "txt_record_value",
      +    "http_file_path",
      +    "http_file_content",
      +    "oauth_connected",
      +    "godaddy_connected",
      +    "supports_api_token",
      +    "supports_api_key",
      +    "verified_providers",
      +    "check_count",
      +    "created_at",
      +    "updated_at"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=true, and the description adds genuinely valuable context beyond them: the API token will be exposed in the AI conversation context, and authentication must happen before calling. It does not say whether existing DNS records or a previously connected token get overwritten, which matters for a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence, followed by the security caveat and access instructions. No filler; the ACCESS block is slightly procedural but each line carries operational value.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Auth prerequisites, token-visibility risk, and the target resource are all covered, and an output schema exists so return values need not be described. The one gap is the destructive effect on existing DNS configuration, which is not spelled out.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so both `id` and `api_token` are already documented with meaning and permission requirements. The description adds no additional parameter detail, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (connect), resource (Cloudflare API token to a domain), and the outcome (automated DNS record management). This cleanly distinguishes it from siblings such as connect_godaddy and connect_dns_provider, which target different providers.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides the prerequisite context: a Proof account, and the exact authentication flow (/mcp → Authenticate, or start_login then retry). It does not explicitly compare against provider-specific siblings, but the provider name in the tool makes the selection obvious.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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