threat-intel
threat-intelCVE/threat intelligence - vulnerability lookup, severity ($0.02 USDC per call)
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | No | ||
| keyword | No |
threat-intelCVE/threat intelligence - vulnerability lookup, severity ($0.02 USDC per call)
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | No | ||
| keyword | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotations already declare openWorldHint=true, idempotentHint=true and destructiveHint=false, and the description legitimately adds non-annotation behavior: the per-call charge. However, it never explains what a call returns (severity fields? remediation?) despite readOnlyHint=false implying something beyond a pure read, so the disclosure is only partial.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded fragment with the domain first and the cost last; nothing is padded. It is arguably too terse for a two-parameter paid tool, but there is no wasted text.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, two undocumented parameters, and no annotations covering return shape, the description should at minimum say what a lookup yields and how the two inputs are used. It gives domain and price only, leaving the agent guessing about input selection and output.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% for both cve_id and keyword, so the description carries the full burden and only gestures at cve_id via the word 'CVE'. It never explains the keyword path, nor whether cve_id and keyword are mutually exclusive, alternatives, or combinable — key ambiguity since neither is marked required.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names the domain (CVE/threat intelligence) and the action (vulnerability lookup) plus the payload (severity), so an agent knows this is a lookup-by-CVE or keyword tool. It does not differentiate against any sibling, but none of the listed siblings overlaps with vulnerability data, so the ambiguity cost is low.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The only contextual guidance is the price tag ('$0.02 USDC per call'), which tells the agent when to be cost-conscious but not when this tool is the right choice. There is no statement of prerequisites, no exclusions, and no alternative routing for CVE questions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.