Skip to main content
Glama
Sign In

LFG Alarm

by gm.lfg
OverviewDiscussionsAdmin

Let someone in, or not

answer_join_request
DestructiveIdempotent

Answers one person's request to join a friends alarm the person made. For the creator's side of a request; asking to join someone else's alarm is separate. Letting them in adds them to the alarm and tells them; declining clears the request without telling them. Only the alarm's creator can answer; letting in someone whose request is gone returns an error.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>",
      "user": "<user>",
      "let_in": "<let_in>"
    },
    "name": "answer_join_request"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesThe alarm's id.
userYesThe id of the person who asked.
let_inYestrue to let them in, false to decline.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the annotations by disclosing the asymmetric side effects: letting in adds the user and notifies them, declining silently clears the request with no notification. It also flags the authorization requirement and the stale-request error, which the destructiveHint=true annotation alone would not convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four tight sentences, each carrying a distinct fact (scope, alternative, side effects, preconditions/errors) with no filler. The opening sentence is slightly tangled ('a friends alarm the person made'), which costs a point but does not obscure the meaning.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, so the description carries the return-behavior burden and does so: it explains what each branch does and what error occurs on a stale request. Combined with full schema coverage, an agent has everything needed to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the boolean semantics of let_in are already documented in the schema, so the description adds no parameter-level syntax or format detail. Baseline 3 is appropriate; the description's value is behavioral rather than parameter-level.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: answering one person's join request for an alarm. It immediately disambiguates the creator-side operation from the requester-side operation ('asking to join someone else's alarm is separate'), which maps onto the sibling join_alarm.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly frames this as the creator's side and names the separate path for the other side, giving the agent a routing rule rather than leaving it to infer from the name. It also states the precondition ('Only the alarm's creator can answer') and the failure condition for a stale request.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All LFG Alarm toolsInspect
Try in Browser
One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources