Skip to main content
Glama

xchain_sign_checkpoint

Destructive

[STATE] Co-sign a cross-chain transcript checkpoint. Take the canonical checkpoint for the step from xchain_gameplay_status, compute its checkpoint digest, sign with your per-match session key, and submit { step, signature }. step=2 is the both-committed checkpoint (signing it releases r_matchup); step=4 is the terminal checkpoint (signing it makes the match settle-ready). Returns { relayed, r_matchup? }.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "step": "<step>",
      "signature": "<signature>"
    },
    "name": "xchain_sign_checkpoint"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stepYesCheckpoint step to co-sign: 2 (both committed) or 4 (terminal).
signatureYes`0x` 65-byte session-key signature over the canonical checkpoint digest returned by xchain_gameplay_status.
poll_handleNoThe poll_handle returned by xchain_find_match. Pass it so the server acts by an unguessable secret, not your public wallet. Optional during rollout.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true, so the safety bar is lower; the description earns credit by naming the actual consequence of each signature ('signing it releases r_matchup', 'makes the match settle-ready') and by giving the return shape { relayed, r_matchup? }. It does not address failure modes, re-signing behavior, or the optional poll_handle rollout caveat, which keeps it from a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The single dense paragraph is front-loaded with a state marker and the action, then moves through prerequisite, procedure, and return value with no filler. The step=2/step=4 consequence sentences partially duplicate labels already in the schema, which is the only redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent mutation with no output schema, the description supplies the prerequisite source tool, the payload shape, the unlock effects, and the return fields. It stops short of covering error or retry behavior and the meaning of a null poll_handle during rollout, which the schema mentions but the description does not explain.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents step, signature and poll_handle in detail, establishing a baseline of 3. The description adds downstream meaning for the step values (what the signature unlocks) and restates the signing procedure for signature, but it never mentions poll_handle, so the added value over structured data is moderate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Co-sign a cross-chain transcript checkpoint') and then spells out the concrete procedure: fetch the canonical checkpoint from xchain_gameplay_status, compute the digest, sign with the per-match session key, submit { step, signature }. This clearly separates it from the xchain_build_* siblings, which construct transactions rather than sign checkpoints.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives the operative conditions in terms of step semantics: step=2 for the both-committed checkpoint and step=4 for the terminal one, and it names the upstream dependency (xchain_gameplay_status) that must supply the digest. It does not explicitly state when-not-to-use or what to do if the checkpoint is already signed, so it falls short of a full when/when-not pairing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources