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xchain_commit_guess

Destructive

[STATE] Commit your guess for a cross-chain match. Unlike the same-chain games, YOU generate and keep the preimage: 32 random bytes R, guess in the low bit of the last byte (0 = same-team, 1 = diff-team) — the shared encoding from the server instructions. Pass commit = 0x + SHA-256(R), keep R secret. Returns {both_committed}; then xchain_gameplay_status for the step-2 checkpoint.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "commit": "<commit>"
    },
    "name": "xchain_commit_guess"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
commitYes`0x` SHA-256 of your guess preimage. Generate a random 32-byte preimage whose last bit encodes your guess (0 = same-team, 1 = diff-team), keep it secret, and submit its SHA-256 here.
poll_handleNoThe poll_handle returned by xchain_find_match. Pass it so the server acts by an unguessable secret, not your public wallet. Optional during rollout.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare this is a non-idempotent, destructive, open-world write. The description adds genuinely new behavioral context: the agent must generate and retain a 32-byte preimage itself, must keep R secret, and receives {both_committed} back. It does not explain why the operation is flagged destructive (e.g. loss of committed stake if the reveal never happens), which is the one piece of annotation-relevant context left unstated.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action and the state marker, then the critical security constraint (keep R secret) and the return value. Dense but nearly every clause carries protocol-necessary information; the 'shared encoding from the server instructions' aside is somewhat redundant given the schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a commit step in a multi-transaction protocol with no output schema, the description supplies the input construction, the secrecy requirement, the return shape ({both_committed}), and the next tool to call. What remains missing is the consequence of failing to reveal, which matters given destructiveHint=true.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema description already spells out the preimage/last-bit encoding and the 0x SHA-256 commit value, so the description largely restates it. It does add the useful cross-reference that this is 'the shared encoding from the server instructions', but says nothing about the poll_handle parameter beyond what the schema states. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Commit your guess for a cross-chain match') and explicitly distinguishes it from the same-chain games, which is exactly the disambiguation an agent needs when both families exist in the catalog. The [STATE] tag signals its position in a multi-step protocol.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context (cross-chain match, not same-chain) and names the follow-up step: 'then xchain_gameplay_status for the step-2 checkpoint'. It does not explicitly name the same-chain alternative tool to avoid, but the 'Unlike the same-chain games' clause makes the routing condition inferable.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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