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CVE → exploit intelligence

cve_exploit
Read-only

For a CVE id: its description, CVSS score and severity, CWE, whether it is in the known-exploited (CISA KEV) catalogue and used by ransomware, plus links to public proof-of-concept and Metasploit repositories, the Nuclei detection template, and vendor advisories. References and metadata only; no exploit code is returned. Without an API key: $0.05 USDC per successful call via x402 (Base or Solana).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cveYesA CVE id, e.g. CVE-2021-44228

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint; the description goes well beyond by disclosing the payment/auth model (API key optional, $0.05 USDC per successful call via x402 on Base or Solana) and the content boundary ('no exploit code is returned'). That cost and output-scope disclosure is exactly the kind of behavioral context the annotations cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the input ('For a CVE id') followed by a dense result enumeration; every clause maps to a distinct returned field. The enumeration is long but each item earns its place, and the cost sentence is placed last where a reader expects it.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description takes on the job of describing return values and does so thoroughly (scoring, classification, exploitation status, artifact links, advisories). Combined with the content limitation and pricing note, an agent has everything needed to decide and call correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only one parameter and schema coverage is 100%, with the schema already giving the 'CVE-2021-44228' example and length bounds. The description adds nothing about format, case sensitivity, or handling of non-CVE identifiers, so it sits at the baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb-like action on a specific resource ('For a CVE id') and enumerates exactly what is resolved: CVSS, CWE, CISA KEV status, ransomware use, PoC/Metasploit repos, Nuclei template, advisories. Nothing in the sibling list (domain/IP/phone/social lookups) overlaps, so the tool is unambiguously distinguishable.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'For a CVE id' plus 'References and metadata only; no exploit code is returned' sets a clear expectation of when this tool applies and what it will not produce. It stops short of naming alternatives or exclusions (e.g., when to prefer a generic http_get or osint-domain call), so it is clear context without explicit routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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