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watch_trip

Start monitoring one trip for disruption changes over time.

Use this tool when the user wants ongoing monitoring of a trip rather
than a one-off assessment (for a one-off answer, use assess_trip).
Persists the trip as a monitored object and returns its initial assessment
plus a random, unguessable trip_id AND a one-time `owner.owner_token`.
Store BOTH: the trip_id is the (public, shareable) URL handle, the
owner_token is the private key needed to change the trip's label or
webhook later. There is no stop call: monitoring ends by itself the day
after date_to.

CREATE vs REFRESH: called with just destinations+dates it CREATES a new
trip every time (it does NOT dedupe on identity — that is deliberate, so
nobody can reach your trip by guessing your itinerary). To update an
existing trip (change its label or webhook), call again passing BOTH its
`trip_id` and `owner_token`; a missing/wrong token is rejected. Each
pipeline run then re-evaluates the trip and appends an update ONLY when
something materially changes (a new/cleared event, a severity/status shift,
or a travel_status change) — never on a calm tick.
Args: destinations — EU-27 ISO2 codes (Greece = "EL") plus the non-EU27
countries we monitor: Norway "NO" (Entur, live), United Kingdom "UK"/"GB"
(TfL, live), Switzerland "CH" (SBB, key-pending → declared blind spot until
keyed); date_from/date_to (YYYY-MM-DD); optional label. An unmonitored code
is rejected with {"error": "unknown_country"} rather than a false all-clear.
Returns {trip_id, assessment, created_at}; invalid inputs return an explicit
{"error": ...}.

Destinations also accept natural input: IATA airport codes (e.g. 'TSR',
'AMS', 'ZRH') and major city names (e.g. 'Timișoara', 'Amsterdam',
'Zürich', 'London'), resolved deterministically to a monitored country
code. The initial assessment includes a 'resolved' list
([{input, country, kind}]) disclosing how each token was mapped
(e.g. 'TSR -> RO via iata-airport'). A token that resolves to a country we
do not monitor is rejected with {'error': 'unknown_country'}; a token we
cannot resolve at all is rejected with
{'error': 'unknown_destination', 'tokens': [...]} — we reject not guess.

Pass `lang` (e.g. "de", "ro", "pl"; default English) to localise the
initial assessment into the traveller's language: the returned
assessment carries the same `localized` block as assess_trip (honest
reassurance, AI-translated-and-LABELLED source text, and the localized
caveats + blind_spots that are never dropped). Localization never becomes a
false all-clear; the aviation handoff discloses the blind spot, not coverage.

Pass `audience` ("tmc" | "hotel" | "ota" | "tour_operator") for role-specific
operational actions — the initial assessment then carries the same `persona`
block as assess_trip (audience + per-event role actions, projected from the
audience-tagged recommendations). Built for the B2B travel-risk buyer.

Pass `notify_webhook_url` (https only) to get PUSH delivery: on every
MATERIAL change the radar POSTs the update record (summary, status
transition, event report URLs) to your URL, signed HMAC-SHA256 over the
raw body (header X-TravelTrends-Signature: sha256=<hex>). The response
then includes `notify.secret` — shown ONLY once, never published; store
it to verify signatures. To change or remove the webhook later, re-call
with the trip_id + owner_token and the new notify_webhook_url (or "" to
remove delivery). After 5 consecutive delivery failures the webhook is
disabled with an honest notify_disabled entry in the trip's updates log.
Non-https or private-network URLs are rejected with
{"error": "invalid_webhook_url"}.

Optional `legs` (same shape and semantics as in assess_trip) are persisted
with the trip; legs[] appears in the assessment returned here. The 6-hourly
radar check re-resolves the stored legs and their modes feed its decision
lines; whats_changed reports the trip-level delta and does not carry a
legs block.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "destinations": "<destinations>",
      "date_from": "<date_from>",
      "date_to": "<date_to>"
    },
    "name": "watch_trip"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
langNo
legsNo
labelNo
date_toYes
trip_idNo
audienceNo
date_fromYes
owner_tokenNo
destinationsYes
notify_webhook_urlNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / legs
      Added value: +{
      +  "anyOf": [
      +    {
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": true,
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    {
      +      "type": "null"
      +    }
      +  ],
      +  "default": null,
      +  "title": "Legs"
      +}
  2. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / owner_token
      Added value: +{
      +  "anyOf": [
      +    {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    {
      +      "type": "null"
      +    }
      +  ],
      +  "default": null,
      +  "title": "Owner Token"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / trip_id
      Added value: +{
      +  "anyOf": [
      +    {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    {
      +      "type": "null"
      +    }
      +  ],
      +  "default": null,
      +  "title": "Trip Id"
      +}
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare non-idempotent, non-read-only, open-world, but the description explains WHY: no dedupe on identity, deliberate, so trips cannot be guessed. It further discloses the owner_token as a non-recoverable private key, HMAC-signed webhook delivery with a one-time notify.secret, the 5-failure auto-disable, and rejection of private-network URLs — none of which is in the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose and the assess_trip handoff, then organized into labelled blocks (CREATE vs REFRESH, Args, Returns, then lang/audience/webhook/legs). It is long and the localization paragraph restates assess_trip's `localized` block at some length, but every section maps to a caller decision, so the density is justified rather than padded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, yet the description documents the return shape ({trip_id, assessment, created_at}), the additional notify.secret, the resolved list inside the assessment, and the full error vocabulary (unknown_country, unknown_destination, invalid_webhook_url). For a 10-parameter mutation tool with a side-effecting webhook, nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0% across 10 parameters, so the description carries the full burden and does: destinations (ISO2 plus IATA/city resolution and the EL/UK/GB/CH edge cases), date formats, label, lang, audience with its four allowed values, notify_webhook_url constraints, legs semantics, and trip_id+owner_token pairing. Error contracts for unresolvable and unmonitored codes ('we reject not guess') are spelled out.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Start monitoring one trip for disruption changes over time') and immediately distinguishes the scope from the sibling: ongoing monitoring vs. a one-off answer. An agent can tell this apart from assess_trip without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit when-to-use ('ongoing monitoring ... rather than a one-off assessment'), names the alternative ('for a one-off answer, use assess_trip'), and adds a detailed CREATE vs REFRESH rule that tells the agent exactly how to avoid duplicating trips. It also states there is no stop call and that monitoring self-expires the day after date_to.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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