Help by DeltaBreen

create_login_secret

Destructive

Make the secret a site signs with to say which of its users is logged in (HS256, the user's id as sub, an expiry). plaintext is the secret, shown this once: put it in the site's server configuration, never in a page. If one exists it is replaced, and the old one keeps working for 24 hours unless stop_old_now. Owner only.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "product_id": "<product_id>"
    },
    "name": "create_login_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`mode`	No	"test" (the default) or "live": which of the site's keys the secret goes with.
`product_id`	Yes	The site's id (a uuid), from list_products.
`stop_old_now`	No	true only if someone else may have the old secret: it stops working at once and everyone is logged out of the form. Otherwise the old one keeps working for 24 hours.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedOct 27, 2026
- changedInput schema / properties / mode / type
```
Previous value: -[
-  "string",
-  "null"
-]New value: +"string"
```
- changedInput schema / properties / stop_old_now / type
```
Previous value: -[
-  "boolean",
-  "null"
-]New value: +"boolean"
```
First observedOct 27, 2026

TDQS

A4.5/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true, but the description adds what the annotations cannot: the secret is shown only once, an existing secret is replaced while the old one keeps working for 24 hours, and stop_old_now collapses that window and logs everyone out. The owner-only permission requirement is also disclosed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core purpose, then the secret-handling instruction, then the replacement semantics. Dense but every clause — including the algorithm and expiry details — carries operational weight.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent mutation with no output schema, the description covers permissions, replacement behavior, the old-secret grace window, and how to handle the returned plaintext. Nothing an agent needs in order to call it safely is absent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema already explains mode, product_id, and the exact consequences of stop_old_now, so the description adds little parameter-level detail. The one extra it contributes is framing plaintext as the one-time secret, which is a return value rather than an input.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a precise verb and resource — generating the secret a site signs its logged-in users with — and pins down the format (HS256, user id as sub, expiry), which the name alone would not convey. That level of specificity clearly separates it from sibling creation tools like new_product_key and new_integration_secret.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives concrete operational guidance: place the one-time plaintext in the site's server configuration, never in a page, and it explains the replace/grace-period behavior so an agent knows calling again is not a no-op. It states 'Owner only' as a prerequisite. What's missing is an explicit pointer to alternatives such as log_everyone_out or new_product_key.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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