Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and destructiveHint=false, so safety is covered. The description adds useful context by specifying that it returns 'references' (not exploit code itself) and lists aggregation sources. However, it does not describe result format or pagination, which would be additional behavioral detail.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single sentence of 14 words that front-loads the action and resource. Every word earns its place, with no redundancy or filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool is simple with two parameters and good annotations. The description provides key context (sources, reference-only nature) and is sufficiently complete for a read-only lookup tool, though it could optionally mention the output shape (e.g., list of URLs).

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the schema already explains cve_id format and verified_only default/filtering. The description adds no extra parameter-specific semantics, so baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb ('Get') and resource ('public exploit code references') scoped to a CVE, and enumerates concrete sources (Metasploit, ExploitDB, GitHub PoCs). This clearly distinguishes it from siblings like get_cve_details and search_cve.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description clearly indicates when to use the tool: when you need exploit code references for a given CVE. It does not explicitly name alternative tools or exclusions, but the context is unambiguous given the sibling tool names.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.