EdgeScreen x402 Security Screening

by dev.workers.asostudio.aso-x402-screen

screen_secret

Read-onlyIdempotent

Deterministic pre-publish secret leak detector & redactor for PRs, logs, and webhooks (OpenAI, Anthropic, AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Google keys, PEM & 64-hex private keys, JWTs, Bearer tokens -> safe, riskScore, masked findings, redactedText). Requires $0.002 (2000 atomic) Base USDC on eip155:8453 via x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "screen_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`text`	No	Alias for `secret`: single text/log/PR snippet (up to 8192 chars) to scan & redact for leaked secrets.
`texts`	No	Alias for `secrets`: array of text snippets (up to 8192 chars each) to scan & redact for leaked secrets.
`secret`	No	Single text/log/diff/webhook payload shorthand (up to 8192 chars) to scan & redact for leaked API keys, private keys, JWTs, and Bearer tokens.
`secrets`	No	Text snippets, PR bodies, logs, or webhook payloads (up to 8192 chars each) to scan & redact for leaked API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Google), PEM/hex private keys, JWTs, and Bearer tokens.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 13, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world), so the description's biggest contribution is the payment requirement: a hard cost of $0.002 / 2000 atomic Base USDC on eip155:8453 supplied via an x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header. That is essential behavior an agent cannot learn from annotations or schema. It stops short of saying what happens when the signature is missing, expired, or underfunded, and does not mention per-request vs per-item billing for the batch form.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, with purpose and scope front-loaded and no filler. The parenthetical arrow-list of output fields is dense and slightly hard to parse, and the payment constraint — a blocking prerequisite — is relegated to the final sentence rather than surfaced earlier.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description appropriately names the return shape (safe, riskScore, masked findings, redactedText), and payment plus scan targets round out an otherwise self-contained definition. Remaining gaps are edge behavior: alias-vs-canonical conflicts, oversize input handling, and x402 failure modes.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all four parameters (text/texts as aliases for secret/secrets, with 8192-char and 25-item caps) are already documented. The description adds no guidance beyond that — notably it never explains precedence when both an alias and its canonical field are supplied, or how many billable units an array of 25 snippets costs.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb pairing ('secret leak detector & redactor') against a specific resource (PRs, logs, webhooks, and text snippets), then enumerates the exact credential families it covers (OpenAI, Anthropic, AWS, GitHub, Stripe, Slack, Google, PEM/hex keys, JWTs, Bearer tokens). This clearly distinguishes it from the address/domain/URL/prompt screening siblings, so an agent can pick it without opening another schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied by the words 'pre-publish' and 'PRs, logs, and webhooks' — the agent can infer this is a pre-commit/pre-publish gate, but there is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or routing to sibling screeners (e.g., whether to call this versus screen_url for a URL containing a key).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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