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security_csp_audit

Read-only

Parse a supplied Content Security Policy and flag selected risky or missing directives. FREE during validation. No key, credits or wallet. Existing source and input limits apply.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
inputYes
requestIdNoOptional legacy field; ignored in free mode.
maxPriceMicroUsdNoOptional legacy field; ignored in free mode.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scopeYes
findingsYes
directivesYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed5 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / maxPriceMicroUsd / description
      Previous value: -"Explicit maximum new debit; 0 means recovery only."New value: +"Optional legacy field; ignored in free mode."
    • removedInput schema / properties / maxPriceMicroUsd / maximum
      Removed value: -999999999999
    • changedInput schema / properties / requestId / description
      Previous value: -"Persist the ID returned by agent_utilities_prepare. Reuse after uncertainty."New value: +"Optional legacy field; ignored in free mode."
    • removedInput schema / properties / requestId / pattern
      Removed value: -"^\\d{13}_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,80}$"
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
      -  "input",
      -  "requestId",
      -  "maxPriceMicroUsd"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "input"
      +]
  2. First observed

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare the read-only, non-destructive, closed-world profile, so the bar is lower. The description adds genuine behavior beyond that: it is free during validation, requires no key/credits/wallet, and is subject to input limits. It does not describe handling of a malformed or empty policy, but the cost/auth context is valuable.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence, with pricing/limits as short supporting clauses. There is no wasted prose, though the final fragment 'Existing source and input limits apply' is a bit vague about what those limits are.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return structure needn't be explained, and annotations carry the safety profile. The description covers purpose and cost/auth context; the remaining gap is that 'selected risky or missing directives' does not say which directives are checked, leaving an agent without concrete expectations.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 67% and the two undocumented-by-description legacy fields (requestId, maxPriceMicroUsd) are explicitly marked 'ignored in free mode' in the schema. The description's 'No key, credits or wallet' reinforces why those are ignored and loosely implies the 'policy' input, but adds no syntax or format detail beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Parse a supplied Content Security Policy and flag selected risky or missing directives.' An agent can identify the operation clearly. However, it does not differentiate from siblings like security_header_audit or security_cookie_audit, which also audit security artifacts.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: the agent infers it should supply an existing CSP string to be audited. There is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or pointer to the header/cookie audit siblings for related checks. 'Existing source and input limits apply' is a constraint note, not selection guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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