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Safe-Send Check: crypto support triage, sanctions and scam screening

Address-poisoning look-alike check against addresses you trust ($0.001)

detect_address_poisoning_lookalike
Read-onlyIdempotent

Compare a destination address with up to 50 addresses you already trust (address book, past counterparties): catches vanity "dust attack" look-alikes with the same first and last characters. Verdict exact_match / lookalike / partial / no_match. PAID: $0.001 per call or 1 prepaid credits, no account. Pay with x402 over MCP (USDC on Base), or with a credits key bought by a plain USDC transfer (credits_quote / credits_claim, then header Authorization: Bearer ssk_...). An unpaid call returns the payment terms and charges nothing; bad input is rejected before any payment; failed work is never charged. Same data as GET /v1/poison-check.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "address": "<address>",
      "known": "<known>"
    },
    "name": "detect_address_poisoning_lookalike"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
knownYesComma-separated trusted addresses (max 50)
addressYesDestination address you are about to send to

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive, and the description adds charge semantics the schema cannot express: unpaid calls return payment terms and cost nothing, bad input is rejected before payment, failed work is never charged. Payment paths (x402 over MCP in USDC on Base, or a credits key via Bearer header obtained from credits_quote/credits_claim) are spelled out concretely.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and verdict vocabulary are front-loaded in the first two sentences, with pricing and payment mechanics after. The payment parenthetical is dense (x402, USDC on Base, credits key, Bearer header) but each clause is operationally relevant rather than filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter read-only check with no output schema, the description supplies the key return vocabulary (exact_match / lookalike / partial / no_match) and full billing behavior. It could note whether the response identifies which trusted address matched, but nothing essential to correct invocation is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so both parameters are already documented as 'destination address' and 'comma-separated trusted addresses (max 50)'. The description adds only modest meaning by naming provenance for the trusted list ('address book, past counterparties') and does not clarify accepted address formats or normalization rules.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: compare a destination address against up to 50 trusted addresses to catch vanity 'dust attack' look-alikes sharing first and last characters. The distinctive scope (look-alike detection against a user-supplied trusted list, not sanctions or general pre-send checks) makes it separable from sibling screening tools without name-dropping them.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Implies the exact context of use ('address you are about to send to' plus 'addresses you already trust'), which tells the agent when this is the right call. It gives no explicit exclusions or routing to alternatives such as check_crypto_address_before_sending or screen_wallet_ofac_sanctions for callers without a trusted list.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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