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Crypto Support Desk (zh/en)

Address-poisoning look-alike check (free)

check_address_poisoning
Read-onlyIdempotent

FREE, offline. Compares a destination address with addresses the user already trusts (address book, past counterparties) and flags look-alikes that share the first and last characters but differ in the middle: the address-poisoning scam pattern.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "address": "<address>",
      "known": "<known>"
    },
    "name": "check_address_poisoning"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
knownYesTrusted addresses: an array or a comma-separated string (max 50)
addressYesDestination address the user is about to send to

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world behavior, so the bar is lower. The description's real addition is 'FREE, offline,' which tells the agent no network call or cost is incurred. It does not describe the result shape (which match wins, what is returned for no match) despite there being no output schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with cost/offline status, then the mechanism and the scam pattern it maps to. No filler and nothing repeated from structured fields.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter, annotation-covered check tool this covers purpose, cost model, and detection logic well. The main gap is the absence of any statement about what a match or non-match yields, which matters because there is no output schema to fall back on.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so 3 is the baseline. The description adds genuine meaning by clarifying that 'known' means the address book or past counterparties, richer than the schema's bare 'Trusted addresses', and it explains the first/last-character comparison the address is checked against. It does not explain the accepted string-vs-array forms, which the schema handles.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a concrete verb and resource ('compares a destination address with addresses the user already trusts') and specifies the exact detection heuristic: shared first and last characters with a differing middle. That is far more specific than a tautological name restatement, though it never explicitly contrasts itself with the sibling check_crypto_address, so an agent must infer the split.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'FREE, offline' is an implicit routing signal: prefer this when cost or network access matters. The schema's 'about to send to' wording also implies the pre-send moment. But there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not statement and no named alternative, leaving the agent to infer usage from context.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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