Get a signing nonce
locker_nonceFree. Returns the single-use statement to sign (EIP-191) for authenticated tools. Expires in 5 minutes.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | Yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
locker_nonceFree. Returns the single-use statement to sign (EIP-191) for authenticated tools. Expires in 5 minutes.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | Yes | EVM wallet address (0x…, the mailbox identity). |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It discloses that the call is free, the nonce is single-use, expires in 5 minutes, and uses EIP-191 format. This gives an agent useful behavioral context, though it omits details like whether the nonce is consumed by this call and what the exact response looks like.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short clauses convey cost, purpose, format, and expiry with no filler. The key fact 'Returns the single-use statement' is front-loaded, and every sentence adds value.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-parameter tool with no output schema, the description covers the essential usage constraints: free, single-use, EIP-191, and 5-minute expiry. It could more explicitly state the next step in the auth flow, but overall an agent has enough to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%: the 'address' parameter is fully described as an EVM wallet address and mailbox identity. The tool description adds no additional parameter meaning beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the verb 'Returns' and the resource 'single-use statement to sign (EIP-191)', which is specific and unambiguous. It does not explicitly name a sibling tool for differentiation, but the nonce-generation purpose is distinct enough from siblings like locker_send or locker_read.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'for authenticated tools' implies this tool is a prerequisite in an authentication flow, and the 5-minute expiry signals time sensitivity. However, there is no explicit guidance on when to use it versus alternatives, nor any when-not-to-use exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Each tool targets a distinct area: mailbox operations (ack/read/count/send), checkpoint storage, key registration/directory, and account/billing info. The only mild ambiguity is that locker_checkpoint bundles save/load/list/delete into one tool, and locker_send can target your own future self, which could blur the boundary with checkpoint storage.
All names share the locker_ prefix and consistent snake_case, which keeps the set cohesive. However, the second part mixes bare verbs (read, send, ack, count, invite) with nouns (capabilities, directory, nonce, status) and one true verb_noun pair (register_key), so the naming convention is not uniform.
Twelve tools is well within the ideal range, and each tool earns its place by covering a distinct capability: mailbox, checkpoint memory, key identity, billing, and onboarding. Nothing feels redundant or like padding.
The set covers the full message lifecycle (send/read/ack/count), checkpoint CRUD via locker_checkpoint, key registration/verification, and billing/status. Minor gaps remain, such as no explicit key revocation/rotation tool or sent-message history, but core workflows are complete.