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Tinplate Edge AI Safety, Security & EU Compliance

tinplate_mcp_manifest_linter

Read-onlyIdempotent

MCP Server Manifest & Tool Security Linter API: Audit MCP server manifests for hidden tool poisoning, shell risks, and excessive permissions. (Endpoint: POST /v1/mcp-manifest-linter)

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "manifest": "<manifest>"
    },
    "name": "tinplate_mcp_manifest_linter"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
manifestYesStructured object parameter 'manifest'

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false, idempotentHint=true, and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds real value beyond that by disclosing what the audit detects (tool poisoning, shell risks, excessive permissions) and the underlying HTTP endpoint. It stops short of describing findings format or severity reporting.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two compact sentences with the audit scope front-loaded and no filler. The trailing endpoint parenthetical is only marginally useful for an MCP caller, but it costs little.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the burden of explaining what the linter returns, and it does not — no mention of findings, severities, or pass/fail shape. For a single-parameter read-only tool whose annotations are thorough, this is a notable but not fatal gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is nominally 100% and there is only one parameter, so the baseline is 3. However, the schema text is merely 'Structured object parameter manifest' and the manifest is a nested object with no structural detail anywhere, so the description does not compensate for that thin documentation.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource ('Audit MCP server manifests') and names concrete audit targets: hidden tool poisoning, shell risks, and excessive permissions. That specificity separates it from generic guard siblings like prompt_guard or secret_scanner, though no sibling is named explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance and no statement of prerequisites or alternatives. Usage is only implied by the purpose statement ('audit MCP server manifests'), so an agent must infer the triggering condition.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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