seekrit — secrets for agents

uncompose_group

Idempotent

Remove a composed group from an application environment. The group and its secrets are untouched — only the link is dropped — but the environment stops resolving every name it inherited from that group, which will break a workload still reading one. Check list_env_groups first, and use delete_group to destroy the group itself. Safe to repeat. Returns { ok: true }.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`app`	Yes	Application slug or id, as returned by list_apps (e.g. "storefront").
`env`	Yes	Environment slug or id within that application, as returned by list_envs (e.g. "production").
`org`	No	Organization slug or id. Omit it when the credential can reach exactly one org — that org is used automatically. With several, the error names every slug you may pass; list them yourself with list_orgs.
`group`	Yes	Shared-group slug or id, as returned by list_groups (e.g. "shared-datastores").

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes beyond the annotations by explaining the exact side effect: the group link is removed, secrets are untouched, and inherited names stop resolving. It also discloses idempotency ('Safe to repeat'), which aligns with and reinforces the idempotentHint annotation, and states the return value. No contradiction with annotations exists.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and front-loaded: main action first, then side effects, then guidance, then repeatability and return type. Every sentence contributes meaningful information with no redundancy or filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the high schema coverage, rich annotations, and moderate complexity, the description is fully sufficient. It covers the operation, side effects, safety, idempotency, return value, and related tools, so an agent has everything needed to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already covers all four parameters with detailed descriptions and 100% coverage. The tool description does not need to add much parameter-level detail, and it does not. It provides useful context about the group being a 'composed group' but relies on the schema for parameter meanings, which is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Remove a composed group from an application environment.' It immediately distinguishes the action from delete_group by clarifying that the group and its secrets remain untouched and only the link is dropped. This makes the tool's identity and scope unmistakable.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides explicit preconditions and alternatives: 'Check list_env_groups first' and 'use delete_group to destroy the group itself.' It also warns when not to use it casually by noting that it can break workloads still reading inherited names. This is strong directional guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0

Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target a distinct resource and action, and many descriptions explicitly call out their near neighbors (list_envs vs list_env_groups vs list_group_envs). The main ambiguity is the three-way env/group listing cluster and the partial overlap between list_orgs and whoami, but the descriptions largely mitigate misselection.

Naming Consistency4/5

Snake_case verb_noun naming dominates (list_*, create_*, delete_*, revoke_*, rename_*), and the kms_ prefix is used consistently. A few outliers like audit, billing, whoami, signup, get_started, local_tool_for, and setup_local_crypto break the strict pattern, but they are still readable and no camelCase or chaotic mixing is present.

Tool Count2/5

40 tools is far above the 25-tool threshold and creates a heavy surface for an agent to navigate. The broad domain of apps, groups, envs, secrets, members, tokens, KMS, and leases partially justifies the size, but several list/delete/revoke families could be consolidated.

Completeness3/5

The set covers control-plane lifecycle well for apps, groups, and invitations, and provides solid list/delete/revoke coverage for envs, branches, tokens, leases, and KMS. However, create operations for envs, branches, tokens, and leases, plus all secret value reads/writes, are deliberately delegated to the local crypto plane; local_tool_for and setup_local_crypto help bridge the gap, but the server is not standalone-complete.

Resources

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