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seekrit — secrets for agents

revoke_token

DestructiveIdempotent

Revoke a service token by id. Future key fetches by that token stop immediately, so any workload still using it loses access on its next read. If the holder may have cached the key already, also rotate the environment on the local crypto plane — revocation alone does not re-encrypt anything. Find the id with list_tokens. Returns { ok, tokenId }.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
orgNoOrganization slug or id. Omit it when the credential can reach exactly one org — that org is used automatically. With several, the error names every slug you may pass; list them yourself with list_orgs.
tokenIdYesThe token's id from list_tokens — not the token string, which is never stored.

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, the description explains the immediate operational impact: 'Future key fetches by that token stop immediately, so any workload still using it loses access on its next read.' It also discloses the important limitation that revocation alone does not re-encrypt anything and warns about cached keys. This is rich, useful behavior context that annotations alone do not provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is concise, front-loaded with the core action, and every sentence contributes useful information: the effect, the consequence, the caching caveat, the lookup path, and the return shape. There is no wasted wording.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter tool with a destructive effect, the description covers the operation, immediate consequences, the important cached-key caveat, how to find the required id, and the return value. The annotations already signal destructiveness and non-read-only behavior, so nothing essential is missing for an agent to invoke this tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds only minor parameter guidance by telling the user to find the tokenId with list_tokens, but the schema already states that tokenId comes from list_tokens and is not the token string. The description does not need to compensate for missing schema documentation.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific action and resource: 'Revoke a service token by id.' It clearly distinguishes this from sibling revoke tools by scoping to service tokens found via list_tokens, so an agent can tell it apart without checking schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives clear context: use revocation when you need a token to stop working immediately, and it points to list_tokens for obtaining the id. It also notes when an additional step is needed (rotating the environment if keys may be cached). It does not explicitly name sibling alternatives like kms_revoke_grant or revoke_invite, but the resource type makes the intended use fairly unambiguous.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target a distinct resource and action, and many descriptions explicitly call out their near neighbors (list_envs vs list_env_groups vs list_group_envs). The main ambiguity is the three-way env/group listing cluster and the partial overlap between list_orgs and whoami, but the descriptions largely mitigate misselection.

Naming Consistency4/5

Snake_case verb_noun naming dominates (list_*, create_*, delete_*, revoke_*, rename_*), and the kms_ prefix is used consistently. A few outliers like audit, billing, whoami, signup, get_started, local_tool_for, and setup_local_crypto break the strict pattern, but they are still readable and no camelCase or chaotic mixing is present.

Tool Count2/5

40 tools is far above the 25-tool threshold and creates a heavy surface for an agent to navigate. The broad domain of apps, groups, envs, secrets, members, tokens, KMS, and leases partially justifies the size, but several list/delete/revoke families could be consolidated.

Completeness3/5

The set covers control-plane lifecycle well for apps, groups, and invitations, and provides solid list/delete/revoke coverage for envs, branches, tokens, leases, and KMS. However, create operations for envs, branches, tokens, and leases, plus all secret value reads/writes, are deliberately delegated to the local crypto plane; local_tool_for and setup_local_crypto help bridge the gap, but the server is not standalone-complete.

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