seekrit — secrets for agents

kms_revoke_grant

DestructiveIdempotent

Revoke one principal's grant on a managed KMS key, across all its versions — that user or service token can no longer use the key, while everyone else keeps working. Use kms_disable_key instead to stop the key entirely. Removing a grant needs no key material, which is why it runs here. Returns { ok, keyId, principalId }.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`org`	No	Organization slug or id. Omit it when the credential can reach exactly one org — that org is used automatically. With several, the error names every slug you may pass; list them yourself with list_orgs.
`keyId`	Yes	The managed key's id, from kms_list_keys (the `id` field — `name` is a display label and is not accepted here).
`principalId`	Yes	The principal's id — a `userId` from list_members, or a token `id` from list_tokens, matching principalType.
`principalType`	Yes	What kind of principal to revoke: "user" for a human member (list_members) or "service_token" for a machine credential (list_tokens).

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructiveHint annotation, the description states the exact blast radius: 'that user or service token can no longer use the key, while everyone else keeps working.' It also clarifies scope ('across all its versions') and the return shape, which is valuable for a destructive operation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, each earning its place: action and effect, primary alternative, rationale, and return value. The information is front-loaded and there is no filler or repetition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The combination of a rich schema, clear annotations, and a description covering effect, alternative, scope, and return value gives an agent everything needed to select and invoke the tool correctly. There is no output schema, but the description explicitly states the return object.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the property descriptions are already detailed — they explain where to obtain keyId and principalId, and how org resolution works. The description itself does not add parameter-level detail, but that is acceptable because the schema carries the burden.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Revoke one principal's grant on a managed KMS key, across all its versions.' It also distinguishes itself from the main sibling by saying 'Use kms_disable_key instead to stop the key entirely,' so an agent can immediately tell what this tool does and what it does not do.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly names the key alternative and the condition for choosing it: stop the key entirely vs. revoke one principal's grant. The line 'Removing a grant needs no key material, which is why it runs here' also gives context about when this tool is the appropriate one to use.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All seekrit — secrets for agents tools Inspect

Try in Browser

RayrunBuild, deploy, and operate MCP servers without becoming an infrastructure team.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

TDQS

A4.1/5.0

Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target a distinct resource and action, and many descriptions explicitly call out their near neighbors (list_envs vs list_env_groups vs list_group_envs). The main ambiguity is the three-way env/group listing cluster and the partial overlap between list_orgs and whoami, but the descriptions largely mitigate misselection.

Naming Consistency4/5

Snake_case verb_noun naming dominates (list_*, create_*, delete_*, revoke_*, rename_*), and the kms_ prefix is used consistently. A few outliers like audit, billing, whoami, signup, get_started, local_tool_for, and setup_local_crypto break the strict pattern, but they are still readable and no camelCase or chaotic mixing is present.

Tool Count2/5

40 tools is far above the 25-tool threshold and creates a heavy surface for an agent to navigate. The broad domain of apps, groups, envs, secrets, members, tokens, KMS, and leases partially justifies the size, but several list/delete/revoke families could be consolidated.

Completeness3/5

The set covers control-plane lifecycle well for apps, groups, and invitations, and provides solid list/delete/revoke coverage for envs, branches, tokens, leases, and KMS. However, create operations for envs, branches, tokens, and leases, plus all secret value reads/writes, are deliberately delegated to the local crypto plane; local_tool_for and setup_local_crypto help bridge the gap, but the server is not standalone-complete.

Resources

Need Help?