seekrit — secrets for agents

kms_list_keys

Read-onlyIdempotent

List the managed KMS keys the caller can see — symmetric and signing keys seekrit stores wrapped, for encrypting data outside the secret store. Metadata only: key material is fetched and used on the local crypto plane (kms_encrypt / kms_decrypt / kms_sign live there, not here). Use it to find a keyId for kms_disable_key or kms_revoke_grant. Returns [{ id, name, purpose, spec, currentVersion, applicationId, groupId, disabledAt, createdAt }] — a non-null disabledAt means the key is already disabled.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`org`	No	Organization slug or id. Omit it when the credential can reach exactly one org — that org is used automatically. With several, the error names every slug you may pass; list them yourself with list_orgs.

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, and non-destructive behavior. The description adds meaningful context beyond those hints by explicitly stating 'Metadata only', clarifying that key material is fetched and used on the local crypto plane, and documenting the return shape with the semantic meaning of `disabledAt`. No contradiction with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: what the tool lists, what it does not do, how to use the result, and the return shape. The core purpose is front-loaded, and the alternative-tool routing comes immediately after. No filler or redundant restatement.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a list tool with one optional parameter and no output schema, the description is complete: it names the return fields, explains a key condition (`disabledAt` non-null), and gives cross-references to dependent tools. The annotations cover safety, and the schema covers parameters, so an agent has everything needed to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% for the single optional `org` parameter, and the schema already explains the omit-when-single-org behavior and the error fallback. The description does not need to repeat this; the baseline of 3 is appropriate because the schema carries the parameter semantics fully.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'List the managed KMS keys the caller can see.' It further distinguishes itself from crypto-operation tools by stating that key material is fetched and used on the local crypto plane, not here. This clearly sets the scope as metadata-only listing and separates it from kms_encrypt/kms_decrypt/kms_sign.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly tells the agent when to use this tool: to find a `keyId` for kms_disable_key or kms_revoke_grant. It also provides an exclusion by noting that encrypt/decrypt/sign operations live elsewhere, preventing misuse. This is strong, concrete routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0

Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target a distinct resource and action, and many descriptions explicitly call out their near neighbors (list_envs vs list_env_groups vs list_group_envs). The main ambiguity is the three-way env/group listing cluster and the partial overlap between list_orgs and whoami, but the descriptions largely mitigate misselection.

Naming Consistency4/5

Snake_case verb_noun naming dominates (list_*, create_*, delete_*, revoke_*, rename_*), and the kms_ prefix is used consistently. A few outliers like audit, billing, whoami, signup, get_started, local_tool_for, and setup_local_crypto break the strict pattern, but they are still readable and no camelCase or chaotic mixing is present.

Tool Count2/5

40 tools is far above the 25-tool threshold and creates a heavy surface for an agent to navigate. The broad domain of apps, groups, envs, secrets, members, tokens, KMS, and leases partially justifies the size, but several list/delete/revoke families could be consolidated.

Completeness3/5

The set covers control-plane lifecycle well for apps, groups, and invitations, and provides solid list/delete/revoke coverage for envs, branches, tokens, leases, and KMS. However, create operations for envs, branches, tokens, and leases, plus all secret value reads/writes, are deliberately delegated to the local crypto plane; local_tool_for and setup_local_crypto help bridge the gap, but the server is not standalone-complete.

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