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seekrit — secrets for agents

delete_secret

DestructiveIdempotent

Delete a secret from an environment, discarding its ciphertext and every version. Irreversible — restore_secret CANNOT bring it back (that only rolls back within a surviving secret's history), and re-creating it means setting the value again on the local crypto plane. Prefer restore_secret to undo a bad write. Confirm intent before calling. Returns { ok, name } — or { ok, queued: true, changeRequestId } if the environment requires approval, in which case NOTHING was deleted until a human approves.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
appYesApplication slug or id, as returned by list_apps (e.g. "storefront").
envYesEnvironment slug or id within that application, as returned by list_envs (e.g. "production").
orgNoOrganization slug or id. Omit it when the credential can reach exactly one org — that org is used automatically. With several, the error names every slug you may pass; list them yourself with list_orgs.
nameYesThe secret's name — the variable name it is injected as, e.g. "DATABASE_URL". Names come from list_secrets; this is never a value.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / app / description
      Added value: +"Application slug or id, as returned by list_apps (e.g. \"storefront\")."
    • addedInput schema / properties / env / description
      Added value: +"Environment slug or id within that application, as returned by list_envs (e.g. \"production\")."
    • addedInput schema / properties / name / description
      Added value: +"The secret's name — the variable name it is injected as, e.g. \"DATABASE_URL\". Names come from list_secrets; this is never a value."
    • addedInput schema / properties / org / description
      Added value: +"Organization slug or id. Omit it when the credential can reach exactly one org — that org is used automatically. With several, the error names every slug you may pass; list them yourself with list_orgs."
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes well beyond the annotations by disclosing irreversibility, that ciphertext and every version are discarded, that restore_secret cannot recover it, and that a queued response means nothing was deleted. It also states concrete return shapes. This is rich behavioral context that the annotations alone do not provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: the action and destructive consequence are front-loaded, then the alternative tool, then the approval/return behavior. It is long only because it conveys genuinely important operational nuance, not padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description correctly supplies the return shape in both normal and approval-required modes. It covers irreversibility, recovery alternatives, confirmation guidance, and the queued-deletion edge case. For a destructive tool with four parameters, this is complete enough for an agent to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already documents all four parameters thoroughly with 100% coverage, including examples and the optional behavior of org. The description adds context about the operation and crypto plane but no additional parameter-level semantics. Baseline of 3 is appropriate because the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a precise verb and resource: 'Delete a secret from an environment, discarding its ciphertext and every version.' It also clearly distinguishes itself from the sibling restore_secret by explaining what that tool can and cannot do, so an agent can tell the operations apart.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly tells the agent when to prefer restore_secret instead ('Prefer restore_secret to undo a bad write'), instructs to confirm intent before calling, and explains the approval-required case where nothing is actually deleted until a human approves. This is explicit when-to-use guidance with alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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