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seekrit — secrets for agents

delete_group

DestructiveIdempotent

Delete a shared group together with its environments and their secrets, discarding the ciphertext. Irreversible. Every application environment that composed this group loses those names — check list_env_groups (or use uncompose_group) before deciding the group is unused. Confirm intent before calling. Returns { ok, group }.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
orgNoOrganization slug or id. Omit it when the credential can reach exactly one org — that org is used automatically. With several, the error names every slug you may pass; list them yourself with list_orgs.
groupYesShared-group slug or id, as returned by list_groups (e.g. "shared-datastores").

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations (destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false), the description discloses that the operation is irreversible, discards ciphertext, affects composed environments, and returns { ok, group }. This adds meaningful behavioral context about side effects and return shape that annotations alone do not provide, and it does not contradict any annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and well structured, front-loading the core destructive action, then the irreversibility, then the precautionary guidance, and finally the return value. Every sentence earns its place and there is no filler or redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the destructive nature of the tool, the description covers what is deleted, why it is dangerous, how to verify with list_env_groups, an alternative via uncompose_group, and the return shape. With annotations already covering safety hints and schema covering parameters, nothing critical is missing for an agent to decide and invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already provides 100% coverage with clear descriptions for both group and org parameters, so the description does not need to add parameter-level semantics. It mentions 'group' in context but adds little beyond the schema; the baseline of 3 is appropriate because the schema already carries the full burden.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the specific verb 'Delete' and the resource 'a shared group', and goes further to specify that it also removes the group's environments and their secrets. It is well distinguished from sibling tools like delete_app, delete_env, delete_secret, and uncompose_group, so an agent can immediately tell what resource is affected.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit pre-call guidance: check list_env_groups or use uncompose_group before deciding the group is unused. It also instructs the agent to confirm intent before calling, which is essential for a destructive operation. This clearly communicates when to use the tool and what safer alternatives exist.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target a distinct resource and action, and many descriptions explicitly call out their near neighbors (list_envs vs list_env_groups vs list_group_envs). The main ambiguity is the three-way env/group listing cluster and the partial overlap between list_orgs and whoami, but the descriptions largely mitigate misselection.

Naming Consistency4/5

Snake_case verb_noun naming dominates (list_*, create_*, delete_*, revoke_*, rename_*), and the kms_ prefix is used consistently. A few outliers like audit, billing, whoami, signup, get_started, local_tool_for, and setup_local_crypto break the strict pattern, but they are still readable and no camelCase or chaotic mixing is present.

Tool Count2/5

40 tools is far above the 25-tool threshold and creates a heavy surface for an agent to navigate. The broad domain of apps, groups, envs, secrets, members, tokens, KMS, and leases partially justifies the size, but several list/delete/revoke families could be consolidated.

Completeness3/5

The set covers control-plane lifecycle well for apps, groups, and invitations, and provides solid list/delete/revoke coverage for envs, branches, tokens, leases, and KMS. However, create operations for envs, branches, tokens, and leases, plus all secret value reads/writes, are deliberately delegated to the local crypto plane; local_tool_for and setup_local_crypto help bridge the gap, but the server is not standalone-complete.

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