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seekrit — secrets for agents

delete_env

DestructiveIdempotent

Delete one application environment and the secrets it owns, discarding the ciphertext. Irreversible, and the environment's data key goes with it — recreating the environment means setting every value again on the local crypto plane. Sibling environments and the application itself are untouched; use delete_app to remove all of them. Confirm intent before calling. Returns { ok, env }.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
appYesApplication slug or id, as returned by list_apps (e.g. "storefront").
envYesEnvironment slug or id within that application, as returned by list_envs (e.g. "production").
orgNoOrganization slug or id. Omit it when the credential can reach exactly one org — that org is used automatically. With several, the error names every slug you may pass; list them yourself with list_orgs.

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes well beyond the destructiveHint annotation by explaining exactly what is lost: ciphertext, the environment's data key, and all values in that environment. It clarifies that recreation requires setting every value again, which is critical behavioral context for an agent deciding whether to call this tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is appropriately concise and front-loaded with the core purpose before moving to consequences and alternatives. Every sentence contributes meaning, though the phrase 'local crypto plane' is slightly jargon-heavy and could be clearer for an unfamiliar agent.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an irreversible, destructive tool with no output schema, the description covers the key consequences, the return shape, and the relevant alternatives. The schema handles parameter details, and the annotations handle the read-only and idempotency signals, so the description is complete for safe invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already provides full documentation for all three parameters, including app and env with examples and org handling guidance. The description does not add much parameter-level detail, so the baseline score of 3 is appropriate given the 100% schema coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the action (delete), the resource (one application environment), and the additional scope (the secrets it owns and the discarded ciphertext). It explicitly distinguishes itself from delete_app, which removes all environments, so an agent can tell this tool apart from its siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly says sibling environments and the application itself are untouched, and directs the agent to use delete_app when the intent is to remove all of them. It also instructs the agent to confirm intent before calling, which is useful guidance for a destructive operation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target a distinct resource and action, and many descriptions explicitly call out their near neighbors (list_envs vs list_env_groups vs list_group_envs). The main ambiguity is the three-way env/group listing cluster and the partial overlap between list_orgs and whoami, but the descriptions largely mitigate misselection.

Naming Consistency4/5

Snake_case verb_noun naming dominates (list_*, create_*, delete_*, revoke_*, rename_*), and the kms_ prefix is used consistently. A few outliers like audit, billing, whoami, signup, get_started, local_tool_for, and setup_local_crypto break the strict pattern, but they are still readable and no camelCase or chaotic mixing is present.

Tool Count2/5

40 tools is far above the 25-tool threshold and creates a heavy surface for an agent to navigate. The broad domain of apps, groups, envs, secrets, members, tokens, KMS, and leases partially justifies the size, but several list/delete/revoke families could be consolidated.

Completeness3/5

The set covers control-plane lifecycle well for apps, groups, and invitations, and provides solid list/delete/revoke coverage for envs, branches, tokens, leases, and KMS. However, create operations for envs, branches, tokens, and leases, plus all secret value reads/writes, are deliberately delegated to the local crypto plane; local_tool_for and setup_local_crypto help bridge the gap, but the server is not standalone-complete.

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