Skip to main content
Glama

SaaS Pro Max

Prepare command

prepare_command
Destructive

Prepare an exact application or organization action requested by the user, after reading its command schema, when its execution is approval. Returns a short-lived approval URL for the member's fresh passkey. It does not execute the action. Never approve on behalf of the human, change approved inputs, or request secrets in chat.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
appNoApplication id or orgSlug/appSlug for an app command
orgYesOrganization slug or id
filesNoOptional form files, base64 encoded, up to 4 MiB each. File field names come from get_command_schema.
fieldsYesExact fields from get_command_schema. Use strings, repeated string arrays, and serialized JSON for JSON fields. Do not include org, app or _csrf.
reasonYesThe user's reason for this exact change
commandIdYesExact id from list_commands
environmentNoproduction

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and openWorldHint=true; the description adds genuinely new behavioral context a schema cannot express — the output is a short-lived approval URL bound to the member's fresh passkey, the tool is a gate rather than an executor, and the approval must come from the human. No contradiction with destructiveHint (the approval leads to a destructive action), but the garbled phrase 'when its execution is approval' muddies the trigger condition slightly.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with purpose then the return value then the guardrails — every sentence carries weight. The clause 'when its execution is approval' is awkward and hard to parse, costing a point on readability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 7-parameter, nested-object tool with no output schema, the description does the important work: names the prerequisite call, describes the return artifact (approval URL), and states the safety contract. Remaining gaps (file size/encoding, environment semantics) are already documented in the schema, so nothing essential is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 86%, so the schema already carries most parameter meaning. The description only reinforces that inputs must be the exact fields from the command schema and must not be altered post-approval; it says nothing extra about org, app, environment, or the files object beyond what the schema states. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('prepare an exact application or organization action') and adds two clarifying facts agents care about: it returns a short-lived approval URL for the member's passkey and does NOT execute. This implicitly separates it from the sibling execute_command, though it never names that sibling.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a concrete precondition ('after reading its command schema', i.e. get_command_schema first) and explicit prohibitions: never approve on behalf of the human, never change approved inputs, never request secrets in chat. It lacks an explicit 'use execute_command when you actually want execution' routing sentence, so the alternative is only implied by 'It does not execute the action'.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources